Tim,

On Fri, 16 Nov 2018, Tim Chen wrote:

> Add new protection modes for Spectre v2 mitigations against
> Spectre v2 attacks on user processes.  There are three modes:
> 
>       strict mode:
>       In this mode, IBPB and STIBP are deployed full
>       time to protect all processes.
> 
>       lite mode:
>       In this mode, IBPB and STIBP are only deployed on
>       processes marked with TIF_STIBP flag.
> 
>       none mode:
>       In this mode, no mitigations are deployed.
>
> The protection mode can be specified by the spectre_v2_app2app
> boot parameter with the following semantics:
> 
> spectre_v2_app2app=
>       off    - Turn off mitigation
>       lite   - Protect processes which are marked non-dumpable
>       strict - Protect all processes
>       auto   - Kernel selects the mode

Is there any reason why we need yet another naming convention?

pti=                            on, off, auto

spectre_v2=                     on, off, auto

spec_store_bypass_disable =     on, off, auto, prctl, seccomp


>       Not specifying this option is equivalent to
>       spectre_v2_app2app=auto.

For better understanding it's nowhere documented what auto does.

> +     spectre_v2_app2app=
> +                     [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
> +                     application to application (indirect branch speculation)
> +                     vulnerability.
> +
> +                     off    - Unconditionally disable mitigations
> +                     lite   - Protect tasks which have requested restricted
> +                              indirect branch speculation via the
> +                              PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctl(). 
> +                     strict - Protect all processes
> +                     auto   - Kernel selects the mode
> +
> +                     Not specifying this option is equivalent to
> +                     spectre_v2_app2app=auto.
> +
> +                     Setting spectre_v2=off will also turn off this 
> mitigation.
> +
> +                     Setting spectre_v2=on implies unconditionally enabling
> +                     this mitigation.

Can we please have a full documentation for all the spectre_v2 stuff
similar to l1tf?

Thanks,

        tglx


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