Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case security policy has changed since the files were opened.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> --- fs/splice.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c index e7d7080..98025ec 100644 --- a/fs/splice.c +++ b/fs/splice.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/uio.h> +#include <linux/security.h> struct partial_page { unsigned int offset; @@ -931,6 +932,10 @@ static long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out, if (unlikely(ret < 0)) return ret; + ret = security_file_permission(out, MAY_WRITE); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + return ret; + return out->f_op->splice_write(pipe, out, ppos, len, flags); } @@ -953,6 +958,10 @@ static long do_splice_to(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos, if (unlikely(ret < 0)) return ret; + ret = security_file_permission(in, MAY_READ); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + return ret; + return in->f_op->splice_read(in, ppos, pipe, len, flags); } @@ -1271,6 +1280,7 @@ static int get_iovec_page_array(const struct iovec __user *iov, static long do_vmsplice(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *iov, unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned int flags) { + long err; struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; struct page *pages[PIPE_BUFFERS]; struct partial_page partial[PIPE_BUFFERS]; @@ -1289,6 +1299,10 @@ static long do_vmsplice(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *iov, else if (unlikely(!nr_segs)) return 0; + err = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + return err; + spd.nr_pages = get_iovec_page_array(iov, nr_segs, pages, partial, flags & SPLICE_F_GIFT); if (spd.nr_pages <= 0) -- 1.5.0.6 - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/