> On Sep 29, 2018, at 9:35 AM, Jann Horn <ja...@google.com> wrote:
>
> +cc linux-api; please keep them in CC for future versions of the patch
>
>> On Sat, Sep 29, 2018 at 4:29 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyp...@cyphar.com> wrote:
>> The primary motivation for the need for this flag is container runtimes
>> which have to interact with malicious root filesystems in the host
>> namespaces. One of the first requirements for a container runtime to be
>> secure against a malicious rootfs is that they correctly scope symlinks
>> (that is, they should be scoped as though they are chroot(2)ed into the
>> container's rootfs) and ".."-style paths. The already-existing AT_XDEV
>> and AT_NO_PROCLINKS help defend against other potential attacks in a
>> malicious rootfs scenario.
>
> So, I really like the concept for patch 1 of this series (but haven't
> read the code yet); but I dislike this patch because of its footgun
> potential.
>
The code could do it differently: do the path walk and then, before accepting
the result, walk back up and make sure the result is under the starting point.
This is *not* a full solution, though, since a walk above the root gas side
effects on timing, various caches, and possibly network traffic, so it’s open
to Spectre-like attacks in which a malicious container could use a
runtime-initiated AT_THIS_ROOT to infer the existence of directories outside
the container.
But what’s the container usecase? Any sane container is based on pivot_root or
similar, so the runtime can just do the walk in the container context. IOW I’m
a bit confused as to the exact intended use of the whole series. Can you
elaborate?
