Quoting Mimi Zohar ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> This is a re-release of Integrity Based Access Control(IBAC) LSM module
> which bases access control decisions on the new integrity framework
> services. IBAC is a sample LSM module to help clarify the interaction
> between LSM and Linux Integrity Modules(LIM).
>
> New to this release of IBAC is digsig's functionality of preventing
> files open for write to be mmapped, and files that are mmapped from being
> opened for write.
>
> IBAC originally verified/measured executables only in the
> bprm_check_security() hook. By only doing the verification/measurement
> in bprm_check_security(), libraries could be loaded without first being
> verified/measured. This release of IBAC, files are also verified/measured
> in the file_mmap() hook, which catches the libraries, and inode_permission()
> hook, which verifies/measures files tagged, by a userspace application,
> with the extended attribute 'security.measure'.
>
> IBAC can be included or excluded in the kernel configuration. If
> included in the kernel and IBAC_BOOTPARAM is enabled, IBAC can also be
> enabled/disabled on the kernel command line with 'ibac='.
>
> IBAC can be configured to either verify and enforce integrity or to just log
> integrity failures on the kernel command line with 'ibac_enforce='. When
> IBAC_BOOTPARAM is enabled, the default is only to log integrity failures.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> ---
>
> Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/Kconfig
> ===================================================================
> --- /dev/null
> +++ linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
> +config SECURITY_IBAC
> + boolean "IBAC support"
> + depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_NETWORK && INTEGRITY
> + help
> + Integrity Based Access Control(IBAC) uses the Linux
> + Integrity Module(LIM) API calls to verify an executable's
> + metadata and data's integrity. Based on the results,
> + execution permission is permitted/denied. Integrity
> + providers may implement the LIM hooks differently. For
> + more information on integrity verification refer to the
> + specific integrity provider documentation.
> +
> +config SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
> + bool "IBAC boot parameter"
> + depends on SECURITY_IBAC
> + default n
> + help
> + This option adds a kernel parameter 'ibac', which allows IBAC
> + to be disabled at boot. If this option is selected, IBAC
> + functionality can be disabled with ibac=0 on the kernel
> + command line. The purpose of this option is to allow a
> + single kernel image to be distributed with IBAC built in,
> + but not necessarily enabled.
> +
> + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> +
> +config SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
> + int "IBAC boot parameter default value"
> + depends on SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
> + range 0 1
> + default 0
> + help
> + This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
> + 'ibac', which allows IBAC to be enabled at boot. If this
> + option is set to 1 (one), the IBAC kernel parameter will
> + default to 1, enabling IBAC at bootup. If this option is
> + set to 0 (zero), the IBAC kernel parameter will default to 0,
> + disabling IBAC at bootup.
> +
> + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
> +
> +config SECURITY_IBAC_ENFORCE
> + bool "IBAC integrity enforce boot parameter"
> + depends on SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
> + default y
> + help
> + This option adds a kernel parameter 'ibac_enforce', which
> + allows integrity enforcement to be enabled/disabled at boot.
> + If this option is selected, integrity enforcement can be
> + enabled with ibac_enforce=1 on the kernel command line.
> + The default is not to enforce integrity, but simply log
> + integrity verification errors.
> +
> + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
> Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/Makefile
> ===================================================================
> --- /dev/null
> +++ linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/Makefile
> @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
> +#
> +# Makefile for building IBAC
> +#
> +
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC) += ibac.o
> +ibac-y := ibac_main.o
> Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/ibac_main.c
> ===================================================================
> --- /dev/null
> +++ linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/ibac_main.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
> +/*
> + * Integrity Based Access Control(IBAC) sample LSM module calling LIM hooks.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2007 IBM Corporation
> + * Author: Mimi Zohar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> +#include <linux/xattr.h>
> +#include <linux/integrity.h>
> +#include <linux/writeback.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
> +static int ibac_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
> +
> +static int __init ibac_enabled_setup(char *str)
> +{
> + ibac_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
> + return 1;
> +}
> +
> +__setup("ibac=", ibac_enabled_setup);
> +
> +static int integrity_enforce;
> +static int __init integrity_enforce_setup(char *str)
> +{
> + integrity_enforce = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
> + return 1;
> +}
> +
> +__setup("ibac_enforce=", integrity_enforce_setup);
> +
> +#else
> +static int ibac_enabled = 1;
> +static int integrity_enforce = 1;
> +#endif
> +
> +#define get_file_security(file) ((unsigned long)(file->f_security))
> +#define set_file_security(file, val) (file->f_security = (void *)val)
> +
> +#define get_task_security(task) ((unsigned long)(task->security))
> +#define set_task_security(task, val) (task->security = (void *)val)
I understand the above are likely remnants of stacker lsm support, and I
hate to say this, but not only is having those in there going to be
frowned upon, it then leads you later on to do things like
if (get_file_security(file)==0)
when using 0 for null upsets people in itself.
> +
> +#define XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX "measure"
> +#define XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX) -1)
> +
> +struct ibac_isec_data {
> + int mmapped; /* no. of times inode mmapped */
> + int measure; /* inode tagged to be measured */
> + spinlock_t lock; /* protect inode state */
> +};
> +
> +static int ibac_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + struct ibac_isec_data *isec;
> +
> + isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ibac_isec_data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!isec)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
> + inode->i_security = isec;
Heh, for file and task security you use the above helpers, but for inode
you do it like this? :) Please replace all x_security assignments and
checks with this format.
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void ibac_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
> +
> + if (isec) {
> + inode->i_security = NULL;
> + kfree(isec);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * For all inodes allocate inode->i_security(isec), before the security
> + * subsystem is enabled.
> + */
> +static void ibac_fixup_inodes(void)
> +{
> + struct super_block *sb;
> +
> + spin_lock(&sb_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(sb, &super_blocks, s_list) {
> + struct inode *inode;
> +
> + spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
> +
> + spin_lock(&inode_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
> + spin_unlock(&inode_lock);
> +
> + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> + if (!inode->i_security)
> + ibac_inode_alloc_security(inode);
since ibac_inode_alloc_security can return -ENOMEM, maybe you should at
least check for that condition and warn the user?
> + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +
> + spin_lock(&inode_lock);
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&inode_lock);
> +
> + spin_lock(&sb_lock);
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
> +}
> +
> +static void ibac_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + struct ibac_isec_data *isec;
> + char *xattr_flags = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX;
> +
> + if (!inode)
> + return;
> +
> + if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
> + return;
> +
> + if (vfs_getxattr(dentry, xattr_flags, NULL, 0) > 0) {
> + isec = inode->i_security;
> + spin_lock(&isec->lock);
> + isec->measure = 1;
> + spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static inline int is_kernel_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + return (!tsk->mm) ? 1 : 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int verify_metadata_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
> +{
> + int rc, status;
> +
> + if (!dentry)
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = integrity_verify_metadata(dentry, NULL, NULL, NULL, &status);
> + if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + printk(KERN_INFO "ibac: verify_metadata %s failed"
> + "(rc: %d - status: %d)\n",
> + dentry->d_name.name, rc, status);
> + if (!integrity_enforce)
> + rc = 0;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) { /* FAIL | NO_LABEL */
> + if (!is_kernel_thread(current)) {
> + printk(KERN_INFO "ibac: verify_metadata %s "
> + "(Integrity status: %s)\n",
> + dentry->d_name.name,
> + status == INTEGRITY_FAIL ? "FAIL" : "NOLABEL");
> + if (integrity_enforce) {
> + rc = -EACCES;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> + return 0;
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int verify_and_measure_integrity(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct file *file,
> + char *filename, int mask)
> +{
> + int rc, status;
> +
> + if (!dentry && !file)
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = integrity_verify_data(dentry, file, &status);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + printk(KERN_INFO "ibac: %s verify_data failed "
> + "(rc: %d - status: %d)\n", filename, rc, status);
> + if (!integrity_enforce)
> + rc = 0;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
> + if (!is_kernel_thread(current)) {
> + printk(KERN_INFO "ibac: verify_data %s "
> + "(Integrity status: FAIL)\n", filename);
> + if (integrity_enforce) {
> + rc = -EACCES;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* Only measure files that passed integrity verification. */
> + integrity_measure(dentry, file, filename, mask);
> + return 0;
> +out:
> + /*
> + * Verification failed, but as integrity is not being enforced,
> + * we still need to measure.
> + */
> + if (rc == 0)
> + integrity_measure(dentry, file, filename, mask);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int ibac_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
> + struct nameidata *nd)
> +{
> + struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
> + struct dentry *dentry;
> + char *path = NULL;
> + char *fname = NULL;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int measure;
> +
> + dentry = (!nd || !nd->dentry) ? d_find_alias(inode) : nd->dentry;
> + if (!dentry)
> + return 0;
> + if (nd) { /* preferably use fullname */
> + path = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (path)
> + fname = d_path(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, path, PAGE_SIZE);
> + }
> +
> + if (!fname) /* no choice, use short name */
> + fname = (!dentry->d_name.name) ? (char *)dentry->d_iname :
> + (char *)dentry->d_name.name;
Please separate the above out into a helper function.
This name is only ever used for debugging, right? I didn't miss any
place where the name is used for some security decision?
> +
> + /* Measure labeled files */
> + spin_lock(&isec->lock);
> + measure = isec->measure;
> + spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
> +
> + if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (measure == 1)
> + && (mask & MAY_READ)) {
> + rc = verify_metadata_integrity(dentry);
> + if (rc == 0)
> + rc = verify_and_measure_integrity(dentry, NULL,
> + fname, mask);
> + }
> +
> + /* Deny permission to write, if currently mmapped. */
> + if (inode && mask & MAY_WRITE) {
> + spin_lock(&isec->lock);
> + if (isec->mmapped > 0) {
> + printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %s - denied write access"
> + " (isec=%d)\n",
> + __FUNCTION__, fname, isec->mmapped);
> + rc = -EPERM;
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
> + }
> +
> + if (!nd || !nd->dentry)
> + dput(dentry);
> + if (path)
> + free_page((unsigned long)path);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * If the file is opened for writing, deny mmap(PROT_EXEC) access.
> + * Otherwise, increment the inode->i_security, which is our own
> + * writecount. When the file is closed, f->f_security will be 1,
> + * and so we will decrement the inode->i_security.
> + * Just to be clear:
> + * file->f_security is 1 or 0.
> + * inode->i_security->mmapped is the *number* of processes which
> + * have this file mmapped(PROT_EXEC), so it can be >1.
> + */
> +static int ibac_deny_write_access(struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
> + struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
> +
> + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> + if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) {
> + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> + return -ETXTBSY;
> + }
> +
> + spin_lock(&isec->lock);
> + isec->mmapped += 1;
> + spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
> + set_file_security(file, 1);
> + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * decrement our writer count on the inode. When it hits 0, we will
> + * again allow opening the inode for writing.
> + */
> +static void ibac_allow_write_access(struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
> + struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
> +
> + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> + spin_lock(&isec->lock);
> + isec->mmapped -= 1;
> + spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
> + set_file_security(file, 0);
> + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * the file is being closed. If we ever mmaped it for exec, then
> + * file->f_security>0, and we decrement the inode usage count to
> + * show that we are done with it.
> + */
> +static void ibac_file_free_security(struct file *file)
> +{
> + if (file->f_security)
> + ibac_allow_write_access(file);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * We don't want to validate files which can be written while they are
> + * being executed.
> + * This means NFS.
> + */
> +static inline int is_unprotected_file(struct file *file)
> +{
> + if (strcmp(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_type->name, "nfs") == 0)
> + return 1;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Verify data integrity, metadata integrity and measure it.
> + */
> +static int ibac_file_mmap(struct file *file,
> + unsigned long reqprot,
> + unsigned long calcprot, unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + unsigned long prot = reqprot;
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!(prot & VM_EXEC))
> + return 0;
> + if (!file || !file->f_dentry)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (is_unprotected_file(file))
> + return (-EPERM);
> + /*
> + * if file_security is set, then this process has already
> + * incremented the writer count on this inode, don't do
> + * it again.
> + */
> + if (get_file_security(file) == 0) {
> + rc = ibac_deny_write_access(file);
> + if (rc) {
> + if (S_ISCHR(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
> + rc = 0;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + rc = verify_metadata_integrity(file->f_dentry);
> + if (rc == 0) {
> + char *fname = NULL;
> + char *path = NULL;
> +
> + path = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (path)
> + fname = d_path(file->f_dentry, file->f_path.mnt,
> + path, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + if (!fname) /* no choice, use short name */
> + fname = (!file->f_dentry->d_name.name) ?
> + (char *)file->f_dentry->d_iname :
> + (char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
> +
> + rc = verify_and_measure_integrity(NULL, file, fname, MAY_EXEC);
> + if (path)
> + free_page((unsigned long)path);
> + }
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int ibac_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> + struct dentry *dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = verify_metadata_integrity(dentry);
> + if (rc == 0)
> + rc = verify_and_measure_integrity(dentry,
> + bprm->file, bprm->filename,
> + MAY_EXEC);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static struct security_operations ibac_security_ops = {
> + .bprm_check_security = ibac_bprm_check_security,
> + .file_mmap = ibac_file_mmap,
> + .file_free_security = ibac_file_free_security,
> + .inode_alloc_security = ibac_inode_alloc_security,
> + .inode_free_security = ibac_inode_free_security,
> + .inode_permission = ibac_inode_permission,
> + .d_instantiate = ibac_d_instantiate
> +};
> +
> +static int __init init_ibac(void)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!ibac_enabled)
> + return 0;
> +
> + ibac_fixup_inodes();
> + rc = register_security(&ibac_security_ops);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + panic("ibac: unable to register with kernel\n");
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +security_initcall(init_ibac);
> Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/Kconfig
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2.orig/security/Kconfig
> +++ linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/Kconfig
> @@ -114,5 +114,6 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
>
> source security/selinux/Kconfig
>
> +source security/ibac/Kconfig
> endmenu
>
> Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/Makefile
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2.orig/security/Makefile
> +++ linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/Makefile
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ endif
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o dummy.o inode.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o integrity_dummy.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE) += ima/
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC) += ibac/
> # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += commoncap.o capability.o
> Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2.orig/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ parameter is applicable:
> FB The frame buffer device is enabled.
> HW Appropriate hardware is enabled.
> IA-64 IA-64 architecture is enabled.
> + IBAC Integrity Based Access Control support is enabled.
> IMA Integrity measurement architecture is enabled.
> IOSCHED More than one I/O scheduler is enabled.
> IP_PNP IP DHCP, BOOTP, or RARP is enabled.
> @@ -761,6 +762,17 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters.
> ihash_entries= [KNL]
> Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
>
> + ibac= [IBAC] Disable or enable IBAC at boot time.
> + Format: { "0" | "1" }
> + See security/ibac/Kconfig help text.
> + 0 -- disable.
> + 1 -- enable.
> + Default value is set via kernel config option.
> +
> + ibac_enforce= [IBAC] Enable integrity enforcing at boot time.
> + Format: { "0" | "1" }
> + Default is 0 to disable integrity enforcing.
> +
> ima= [IMA] Disable or enable IMA at boot time.
> Format: { "0" | "1" }
> See security/ima/Kconfig help text.
>
>
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