From: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> To enable per-PMU access controls in a following patch we need to start passing in the PMU object pointer to perf_paranoid_* helpers.
This patch only changes the API across the code base without changing the behaviour. Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Alexey Budankov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] --- arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c | 2 +- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 15 ++++++++------- kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 6 ++++-- 7 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c index 3f66fcf8ad99..ae6716cea308 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) if (!(mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE) || sdar_valid) *addrp = mfspr(SPRN_SDAR); - if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && + if (perf_paranoid_kernel(ppmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR))) *addrp = 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c index 24ffa1e88cf9..e416c9e2400a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event) * Note that the default paranoia setting permits unprivileged * users to profile the kernel. */ - if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() && + if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel(event->pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index 707b2a96e516..6b126bdbd16c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -3025,7 +3025,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event) if (x86_pmu.version < 3) return -EINVAL; - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu(event->pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ANY; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c index d32c0eed38ca..878451ef1ace 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event) * the user needs special permissions to be able to use it */ if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) { - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu(event->pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; } diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index 1fa12887ec02..d7938d88c028 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1178,17 +1178,17 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); -static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void) +static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(const struct pmu *pmu) { return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1; } -static inline bool perf_paranoid_cpu(void) +static inline bool perf_paranoid_cpu(const struct pmu *pmu) { return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0; } -static inline bool perf_paranoid_kernel(void) +static inline bool perf_paranoid_kernel(const struct pmu *pmu) { return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1; } diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 12de95b0472e..370c89e81722 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -4113,7 +4113,7 @@ find_get_context(struct pmu *pmu, struct task_struct *task, if (!task) { /* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */ - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu); @@ -5681,7 +5681,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT; locked = vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm + extra; - if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && + if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(event->pmu) && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) { ret = -EPERM; goto unlock; @@ -10487,8 +10487,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_cred; } + pmu = event->pmu; + if (!attr.exclude_kernel) { - if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (perf_paranoid_kernel(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err = -EACCES; goto err_alloc; } @@ -10496,7 +10498,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, /* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) && - perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + perf_paranoid_kernel(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err = -EACCES; goto err_alloc; } @@ -10504,13 +10506,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, /* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) && (attr.branch_sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) && - perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + perf_paranoid_kernel(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err = -EACCES; goto err_alloc; } if (is_sampling_event(event)) { - if (event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT) { + if (pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT) { err = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto err_alloc; } @@ -10520,7 +10522,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, * Special case software events and allow them to be part of * any hardware group. */ - pmu = event->pmu; if (attr.use_clockid) { err = perf_event_set_clock(event, attr.clockid); diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c index c79193e598f5..545a7ef9bfe1 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event, /* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */ if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) { - if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(p_event->pmu) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (!is_sampling_event(p_event)) @@ -81,7 +82,8 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event, * ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak, * only allow root to have these. */ - if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(p_event->pmu) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return 0; -- 2.17.1
