On Tue, May 15, 2018 at 09:47:44AM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Tue, 15 May 2018 13:06:26 +1000
> "Tobin C. Harding" <m...@tobin.cc> wrote:
> 
> > Currently we must wait for enough entropy to become available before
> > hashed pointers can be printed.  We can remove this wait by using the
> > hw RNG if available.
> > 
> > Use hw RNG to get keying material.
> > 
> > Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <m...@tobin.cc>
> > ---
> >  lib/vsprintf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
> >  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > index b82f0c6c2aec..3697a19c2b25 100644
> > --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> > +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > @@ -1657,9 +1657,8 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct 
> > device_node *dn,
> >  static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly;
> >  static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
> >  
> > -static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
> > +static void ptr_key_ready(void)
> >  {
> > -   get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
> >     /*
> >      * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes().
> >      * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true
> 
> Nothing to do with this patch, but I believe there's a missing memory
> barrier in the code.
> 
> Right after this we have:
> 
>       smp_mb();
>       WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true);
> 
> Where the comment says that have_filled_random_ptr_key must be set
> after ptr_key has been updated. But there's no memory barrier on the
> read side. In fact, I think this could be a smp_wmb() instead of a
> smp_mb(). The read side has:
> 
>       if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key))
>               return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec);
> 
> /* Missing memory barrier smp_rmb() here. */
> 
>       hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);
> 
> Thus we can have something like:
> 
>       CPU0                            CPU1
>       ----                            ----
>                                  load ptr_key = 0
>    store ptr_key = random
>    smp_mb()
>    store have_filled_random_ptr_key
> 
>                                  load have_filled_random_ptr_key = true
> 
>                                   BAD BAD BAD!
> 
> I'll send a patch.

Awesome reviewing.  Thanks for catching this.


        Tobin

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