4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Dan Williams <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681) The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.st...@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> [jwang: port to 4.4, no syscall_64] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uprobes.h> #include <asm/desc.h> @@ -381,6 +382,7 @@ __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_ } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that
