4.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Darren Kenny [email protected] commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881 Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]> Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) {
