Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall'
protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling
will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for
now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mi...@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <h...@zytor.com>
Cc: x...@kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jsl...@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.willi...@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 390b3dc3d438..06f1d4c5ec6b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
