On Thu, 4 Jan 2018 15:09:28 -0800 Tony Luck <tony.l...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 11:45 AM, Alexander Kleinsorge > <al...@physik.tu-berlin.de> wrote: > > As Meltdown-Issue depends on allowing to cause many exceptions (usually : > > accessing an invalid address), we could restrict this misusage easy. > > The accesses to the invalid address are performed speculatively by the CPU in > a code branch that is later found to be not taken. Hence there are no > exceptions > at all. Actually for the 'spectre' attack you can sometimes see hints because many of the obvious attack points end up causing a syscall to return an errno value. One thing that might be interesting for the paranoid is indeed to react to some of those (notably EINVAL, EFAULT) by stirring up the mud before that process runs again. Alan
