3.16.52-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebigg...@google.com>
commit ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 upstream.
As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <saff...@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebigg...@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.mor...@oracle.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop one unapplicable change
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char
}
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *di
if (!ret)
ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
out:
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *d
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
out:
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char
if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char
if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
- kfree(sdesc);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
*bloblen = storedsize;
}
out:
- kfree(td);
+ kzfree(td);
return ret;
}
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_p
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kfree(tb);
+ kzfree(tb);
return ret;
}
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key
/* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
- kfree(tb);
+ kzfree(tb);
return ret;
}
@@ -961,12 +961,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct ke
if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
out:
- kfree(datablob);
- kfree(options);
+ kzfree(datablob);
+ kzfree(options);
if (!ret)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
else
- kfree(payload);
+ kzfree(payload);
return ret;
}
@@ -975,8 +975,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
- memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
- kfree(p);
+ kzfree(p);
}
/*
@@ -1015,7 +1014,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
ret = -EINVAL;
- kfree(new_p);
+ kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
@@ -1028,22 +1027,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke
ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kfree(new_p);
+ kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (new_o->pcrlock) {
ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kfree(new_p);
+ kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
- kfree(datablob);
- kfree(new_o);
+ kzfree(datablob);
+ kzfree(new_o);
return ret;
}
@@ -1072,24 +1071,19 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct ke
for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
- kfree(ascii_buf);
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
return -EFAULT;
}
- kfree(ascii_buf);
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
return 2 * p->blob_len;
}
/*
- * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
+ * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
*/
static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
-
- if (!p)
- return;
- memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
- kfree(key->payload.data);
+ kzfree(key->payload.data);
}
struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
