Hi! > This patch series implements something along the lines of KAISER for arm64: > > https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf > > although I wrote this from scratch because the paper has some funny > assumptions about how the architecture works. There is a patch series > in review for x86, which follows a similar approach: > > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<[email protected]> > > and the topic was recently covered by LWN (currently subscriber-only): > > https://lwn.net/Articles/738975/ > > The basic idea is that transitions to and from userspace are proxied > through a trampoline page which is mapped into a separate page table and > can switch the full kernel mapping in and out on exception entry and > exit respectively. This is a valuable defence against various KASLR and > timing attacks, particularly as the trampoline page is at a fixed virtual > address and therefore the kernel text can be randomized > independently.
If I'm willing to do timing attacks to defeat KASLR... what prevents
me from using CPU caches to do that?
There was blackhat talk about exactly that IIRC...
Pavel
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