<james.l.mor...@oracle.com>,linux-e...@vger.kernel.org,linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,linux-f2fs-de...@lists.sourceforge.net,linux-fsde...@vger.kernel.org,linux-...@lists.infradead.org,jfs-discuss...@lists.sourceforge.net,ocfs2-de...@oss.oracle.com,linux-unio...@vger.kernel.org,reiserfs-de...@vger.kernel.org,linux-security-mod...@vger.kernel.org,seli...@tycho.nsa.gov,linux-...@vger.kernel.org,kernel-harden...@lists.openwall.com From: Nicolas Belouin <nico...@belouin.fr> Message-ID: <99179b10-4eae-4fab-9d14-b88515626...@belouin.fr>
On October 21, 2017 6:03:02 PM GMT+02:00, "Serge E. Hallyn" <se...@hallyn.com> wrote: >Quoting Nicolas Belouin (nico...@belouin.fr): >> with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to >> flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted >> xattr is near zero. >> CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as >> entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It >> would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs. > >You say "for example". Are you intending to add more uses? If so, >what >are they? If not, how about renaming it CAP_TRUSTED_XATTR? > I don't see any other use for now, but I don't want it to be too narrow and non usable in a similar context in the future. So I believe the underlying purpose of marking a process as "trusted" (even if for now it only means rw permission on trusted xattr) is more meaningful. >What all does allowing writes to trusted xattrs give you? There are >the overlayfs whiteouts, what else? Nicolas
