On #UD, x86_emulate_instruction() fetches the data from guest memory and
decodes the instruction bytes to assist further. When SEV is enabled, the
instruction bytes will be encrypted using the guest-specific key, hypervisor
will no longer able to fetch the instruction bytes to assist UD handling.
By not installing intercept we let the guest receive and handle #UD.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 64b9f60..4581d03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1432,8 +1432,10 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
                svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= 
VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
        }
 
-       if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+       if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
                svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
+               clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
+       }
 
        mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
 
-- 
2.9.4

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