From: David Windsor <d...@nullcore.net>
Some userspace APIs (e.g. ipc, seq_file) provide precise control over
the size of kernel kmallocs, which provides a trivial way to perform
heap overflow attacks where the attacker must control neighboring
allocations of a specific size. Instead, move these APIs into their own
cache so they cannot interfere with standard kmallocs. This is enabled
with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY_SLABS
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <d...@nullcore.net>
[kees: added SLAB_NO_MERGE flag to allow split of future no-merge Kconfig]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
---
fs/seq_file.c | 2 +-
include/linux/gfp.h | 9 ++++++++-
include/linux/slab.h | 12 ++++++++++++
ipc/msgutil.c | 5 +++--
mm/slab.h | 3 ++-
mm/slab_common.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
7 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/seq_file.c b/fs/seq_file.c
index dc7c2be963ed..5caa58a19bdc 100644
--- a/fs/seq_file.c
+++ b/fs/seq_file.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ static void seq_set_overflow(struct seq_file *m)
static void *seq_buf_alloc(unsigned long size)
{
- return kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ return kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_USERCOPY);
}
/**
diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
index a89d37e8b387..ff4f4a698ad0 100644
--- a/include/linux/gfp.h
+++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
#else
#define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP 0
#endif
+#define ___GFP_USERCOPY 0x4000000u
/* If the above are modified, __GFP_BITS_SHIFT may need updating */
/*
@@ -83,12 +84,17 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
* node with no fallbacks or placement policy enforcements.
*
* __GFP_ACCOUNT causes the allocation to be accounted to kmemcg.
+ *
+ * __GFP_USERCOPY indicates that the page will be explicitly copied to/from
+ * userspace, and may be allocated from a separate kmalloc pool.
+ *
*/
#define __GFP_RECLAIMABLE ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_RECLAIMABLE)
#define __GFP_WRITE ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_WRITE)
#define __GFP_HARDWALL ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_HARDWALL)
#define __GFP_THISNODE ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_THISNODE)
#define __GFP_ACCOUNT ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_ACCOUNT)
+#define __GFP_USERCOPY ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_USERCOPY)
/*
* Watermark modifiers -- controls access to emergency reserves
@@ -188,7 +194,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
#define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)
/* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */
-#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (25 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))
+#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (26 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))
#define __GFP_BITS_MASK ((__force gfp_t)((1 << __GFP_BITS_SHIFT) - 1))
/*
@@ -268,6 +274,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
#define GFP_TRANSHUGE_LIGHT ((GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_COMP | \
__GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NOWARN) & ~__GFP_RECLAIM)
#define GFP_TRANSHUGE (GFP_TRANSHUGE_LIGHT | __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM)
+#define GFP_USERCOPY __GFP_USERCOPY
/* Convert GFP flags to their corresponding migrate type */
#define GFP_MOVABLE_MASK (__GFP_RECLAIMABLE|__GFP_MOVABLE)
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index 97f4a0117b3b..7d9d7d838991 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#define SLAB_POISON 0x00000800UL /* DEBUG: Poison objects */
#define SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN 0x00002000UL /* Align objs on cache lines */
#define SLAB_CACHE_DMA 0x00004000UL /* Use GFP_DMA memory */
+#define SLAB_NO_MERGE 0x00008000UL /* Keep this cache unmerged */
#define SLAB_STORE_USER 0x00010000UL /* DEBUG: Store the
last owner for bug hunting */
#define SLAB_PANIC 0x00040000UL /* Panic if kmem_cache_create()
fails */
/*
@@ -287,6 +288,17 @@ extern struct kmem_cache
*kmalloc_dma_caches[KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1];
#endif
/*
+ * Some userspace APIs (ipc, seq_file) provide precise control over
+ * the size of kernel kmallocs, which provides a trivial way to perform
+ * heap overflow attacks where the attacker must control neighboring
+ * allocations. Instead, move these APIs into their own cache so they
+ * cannot interfere with standard kmallocs.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+extern struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_usersized_caches[KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1];
+#endif
+
+/*
* Figure out which kmalloc slab an allocation of a certain size
* belongs to.
* 0 = zero alloc
diff --git a/ipc/msgutil.c b/ipc/msgutil.c
index bf74eaa5c39f..5ae33d50da26 100644
--- a/ipc/msgutil.c
+++ b/ipc/msgutil.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct msg_msg *alloc_msg(size_t len)
size_t alen;
alen = min(len, DATALEN_MSG);
- msg = kmalloc(sizeof(*msg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ msg = kmalloc(sizeof(*msg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | GFP_USERCOPY);
if (msg == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ static struct msg_msg *alloc_msg(size_t len)
while (len > 0) {
struct msg_msgseg *seg;
alen = min(len, DATALEN_SEG);
- seg = kmalloc(sizeof(*seg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ seg = kmalloc(sizeof(*seg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT |
+ GFP_USERCOPY);
if (seg == NULL)
goto out_err;
*pseg = seg;
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index 4cdc8e64fdbd..874b755f278d 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ static inline unsigned long kmem_cache_flags(unsigned long
object_size,
/* Legal flag mask for kmem_cache_create(), for various configurations */
#define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | SLAB_PANIC | \
- SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS )
+ SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS | \
+ SLAB_NO_MERGE)
#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB)
#define SLAB_DEBUG_FLAGS (SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_POISON | SLAB_STORE_USER)
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 2365dd21623d..6c14d765379f 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
*/
#define SLAB_NEVER_MERGE (SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_POISON | SLAB_STORE_USER | \
SLAB_TRACE | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE | \
- SLAB_FAILSLAB | SLAB_KASAN)
+ SLAB_FAILSLAB | SLAB_KASAN | SLAB_NO_MERGE)
#define SLAB_MERGE_SAME (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
SLAB_NOTRACK | SLAB_ACCOUNT)
@@ -940,6 +940,11 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_dma_caches[KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH +
1];
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_dma_caches);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_usersized_caches[KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1];
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_usersized_caches);
+#endif
+
/*
* Conversion table for small slabs sizes / 8 to the index in the
* kmalloc array. This is necessary for slabs < 192 since we have non power
@@ -1004,6 +1009,12 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
return kmalloc_dma_caches[index];
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+ if (unlikely((flags & GFP_USERCOPY)))
+ return kmalloc_usersized_caches[index];
+#endif
+
return kmalloc_caches[index];
}
@@ -1125,6 +1136,22 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(unsigned long flags)
}
}
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+ for (i = 0; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) {
+ struct kmem_cache *s = kmalloc_caches[i];
+
+ if (s) {
+ int size = kmalloc_size(i);
+ char *n = kasprintf(GFP_NOWAIT,
+ "usersized-kmalloc-%d", size);
+
+ BUG_ON(!n);
+ kmalloc_usersized_caches[i] = create_kmalloc_cache(n,
+ size, SLAB_NO_MERGE | flags, 0, size);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC */
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 93027fdf47d1..0c181cebdb8a 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -154,6 +154,18 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
trying to find such users.
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+ bool "Isolate kernel caches from user-controlled allocations"
+ default HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ help
+ This option creates a separate set of kmalloc caches used to
+ satisfy allocations from userspace APIs that allow for
+ fine-grained control over the size of kernel allocations.
+ Without this, it is much easier for attackers to precisely
+ size and attack heap overflows. If their allocations are
+ confined to a separate cache, attackers must find other ways
+ to prepare heap attacks that will be near their desired target.
+
config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
help
--
2.7.4
