4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Daniel Micay <[email protected]> commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream. The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Arjan van Ven <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_stru set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); #endif /*
