Hi Michael, [auto build test WARNING on char-misc/char-misc-testing] [also build test WARNING on v4.9-rc5] [cannot apply to next-20161115] [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Michael-Ellerman/lkdtm-Add-tests-for-LIST_POISON-and-ZERO_SIZE_PTR/20161115-235441 config: i386-randconfig-x007-201646 (attached as .config) compiler: gcc-6 (Debian 6.2.0-3) 6.2.0 20160901 reproduce: # save the attached .config to linux build tree make ARCH=i386 All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c: In function 'test_poison_ptr': >> drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c:178:9: warning: large integer implicitly truncated >> to unsigned type [-Woverflow] *ptr = 0xdeadbeefabcd1234; ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ vim +178 drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c 162 } 163 164 /* 165 * Creating a mapping and adding mmap_min_addr to the value is cheating 166 * in a way. But it simulates the case where an attacker is able to 167 * cause an access at a small offset from the base value, leading to a 168 * user space access. If an arch doesn't define CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE 169 * then it's likely this will work in the absence of other protections. 170 */ 171 ptr = mmap_min_addr + base; 172 173 pr_info("attempting read of %s %p\n", desc, ptr); 174 val = *ptr; 175 pr_info("FAIL: Was able to read %s! Got 0x%lx\n", desc, val); 176 177 pr_info("attempting write of %s %p\n", desc, ptr); > 178 *ptr = 0xdeadbeefabcd1234; 179 pr_info("FAIL: Was able to write %s! Now = 0x%lx\n", desc, *ptr); 180 181 vm_munmap(uaddr, PAGE_SIZE); 182 } 183 184 void lkdtm_ACCESS_LIST_POISON(void) 185 { 186 test_poison_ptr(LIST_POISON1, "LIST_POISON"); --- 0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
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