From: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk>
commit bca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd upstream.
Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else. Loading a signed module meant for a
kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
force-loaded.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <ru...@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w...@1wt.eu>
---
kernel/module.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index f8a4f48..2c87e52 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2475,13 +2475,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct
module *mod,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
int err = -ENOKEY;
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
const void *mod = info->hdr;
- if (info->len > markerlen &&
+ /*
+ * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+ * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+ */
+ if (flags == 0 &&
+ info->len > markerlen &&
memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen)
== 0) {
/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
info->len -= markerlen;
@@ -2503,7 +2508,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
return err;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -3228,7 +3233,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char
__user *uargs,
struct module *mod;
long err;
- err = module_sig_check(info);
+ err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
--
2.8.0.rc2.1.gbe9624a
