Linus,

Please pull the latest perf-urgent-for-linus git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git 
perf-urgent-for-linus

   # HEAD: cf3beb7c90a8efa16a06b26634cddddc92bb819c perf/x86/intel: Fix 
incorrect lbr_sel_mask value

x86 PMU driver fixes plus a core code race fix.

 Thanks,

        Ingo

------------------>
Adam Borowski (1):
      perf/x86/amd: Set the size of event map array to PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX

Alexander Shishkin (1):
      perf/x86/intel/pt: Don't die on VMXON

Andi Kleen (1):
      perf/x86/intel: Add model number for Skylake Server to perf

Kan Liang (1):
      perf/x86/intel: Fix incorrect lbr_sel_mask value

Peter Zijlstra (2):
      perf/core: Make sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent conform to documentation
      perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race

Srinivas Pandruvada (1):
      perf/x86/intel/rapl: Add missing Haswell model


 arch/x86/events/amd/core.c        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/events/intel/core.c      |  1 +
 arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c       |  6 ++--
 arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c        | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/x86/events/intel/pt.h        |  3 ++
 arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c      |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h |  4 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                |  4 +++
 kernel/events/core.c              | 55 +++++++++++++++++++---------
 9 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
index 86a9bec18dab..bd3e8421b57c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static __initconst const u64 amd_hw_cache_event_ids
 /*
  * AMD Performance Monitor K7 and later.
  */
-static const u64 amd_perfmon_event_map[] =
+static const u64 amd_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX] =
 {
   [PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES]                   = 0x0076,
   [PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS]                 = 0x00c0,
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 68fa55b4d42e..aff79884e17d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -3639,6 +3639,7 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
 
        case 78: /* 14nm Skylake Mobile */
        case 94: /* 14nm Skylake Desktop */
+       case 85: /* 14nm Skylake Server */
                x86_pmu.late_ack = true;
                memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, skl_hw_cache_event_ids, 
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
                memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, skl_hw_cache_extra_regs, 
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c
index 6c3b7c1780c9..1ca5d1e7d4f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static enum {
 
 #define LBR_PLM (LBR_KERNEL | LBR_USER)
 
-#define LBR_SEL_MASK   0x1ff   /* valid bits in LBR_SELECT */
+#define LBR_SEL_MASK   0x3ff   /* valid bits in LBR_SELECT */
 #define LBR_NOT_SUPP   -1      /* LBR filter not supported */
 #define LBR_IGN                0       /* ignored */
 
@@ -610,8 +610,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_setup_hw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event 
*event)
         * The first 9 bits (LBR_SEL_MASK) in LBR_SELECT operate
         * in suppress mode. So LBR_SELECT should be set to
         * (~mask & LBR_SEL_MASK) | (mask & ~LBR_SEL_MASK)
+        * But the 10th bit LBR_CALL_STACK does not operate
+        * in suppress mode.
         */
-       reg->config = mask ^ x86_pmu.lbr_sel_mask;
+       reg->config = mask ^ (x86_pmu.lbr_sel_mask & ~LBR_CALL_STACK);
 
        if ((br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_NO_CYCLES) &&
            (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_NO_FLAGS) &&
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
index 6af7cf71d6b2..09a77dbc73c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
@@ -136,9 +136,21 @@ static int __init pt_pmu_hw_init(void)
        struct dev_ext_attribute *de_attrs;
        struct attribute **attrs;
        size_t size;
+       u64 reg;
        int ret;
        long i;
 
+       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX)) {
+               /*
+                * Intel SDM, 36.5 "Tracing post-VMXON" says that
+                * "IA32_VMX_MISC[bit 14]" being 1 means PT can trace
+                * post-VMXON.
+                */
+               rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, reg);
+               if (reg & BIT(14))
+                       pt_pmu.vmx = true;
+       }
+
        attrs = NULL;
 
        for (i = 0; i < PT_CPUID_LEAVES; i++) {
@@ -269,20 +281,23 @@ static void pt_config(struct perf_event *event)
 
        reg |= (event->attr.config & PT_CONFIG_MASK);
 
+       event->hw.config = reg;
        wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, reg);
 }
 
-static void pt_config_start(bool start)
+static void pt_config_stop(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-       u64 ctl;
+       u64 ctl = READ_ONCE(event->hw.config);
+
+       /* may be already stopped by a PMI */
+       if (!(ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN))
+               return;
 
-       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);
-       if (start)
-               ctl |= RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
-       else
-               ctl &= ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
+       ctl &= ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
        wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);
 
+       WRITE_ONCE(event->hw.config, ctl);
+
        /*
         * A wrmsr that disables trace generation serializes other PT
         * registers and causes all data packets to be written to memory,
@@ -291,8 +306,7 @@ static void pt_config_start(bool start)
         * The below WMB, separating data store and aux_head store matches
         * the consumer's RMB that separates aux_head load and data load.
         */
-       if (!start)
-               wmb();
+       wmb();
 }
 
 static void pt_config_buffer(void *buf, unsigned int topa_idx,
@@ -942,11 +956,17 @@ void intel_pt_interrupt(void)
        if (!ACCESS_ONCE(pt->handle_nmi))
                return;
 
-       pt_config_start(false);
+       /*
+        * If VMX is on and PT does not support it, don't touch anything.
+        */
+       if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
+               return;
 
        if (!event)
                return;
 
+       pt_config_stop(event);
+
        buf = perf_get_aux(&pt->handle);
        if (!buf)
                return;
@@ -983,6 +1003,35 @@ void intel_pt_interrupt(void)
        }
 }
 
+void intel_pt_handle_vmx(int on)
+{
+       struct pt *pt = this_cpu_ptr(&pt_ctx);
+       struct perf_event *event;
+       unsigned long flags;
+
+       /* PT plays nice with VMX, do nothing */
+       if (pt_pmu.vmx)
+               return;
+
+       /*
+        * VMXON will clear RTIT_CTL.TraceEn; we need to make
+        * sure to not try to set it while VMX is on. Disable
+        * interrupts to avoid racing with pmu callbacks;
+        * concurrent PMI should be handled fine.
+        */
+       local_irq_save(flags);
+       WRITE_ONCE(pt->vmx_on, on);
+
+       if (on) {
+               /* prevent pt_config_stop() from writing RTIT_CTL */
+               event = pt->handle.event;
+               if (event)
+                       event->hw.config = 0;
+       }
+       local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_pt_handle_vmx);
+
 /*
  * PMU callbacks
  */
@@ -992,6 +1041,9 @@ static void pt_event_start(struct perf_event *event, int 
mode)
        struct pt *pt = this_cpu_ptr(&pt_ctx);
        struct pt_buffer *buf = perf_get_aux(&pt->handle);
 
+       if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
+               return;
+
        if (!buf || pt_buffer_is_full(buf, pt)) {
                event->hw.state = PERF_HES_STOPPED;
                return;
@@ -1014,7 +1066,8 @@ static void pt_event_stop(struct perf_event *event, int 
mode)
         * see comment in intel_pt_interrupt().
         */
        ACCESS_ONCE(pt->handle_nmi) = 0;
-       pt_config_start(false);
+
+       pt_config_stop(event);
 
        if (event->hw.state == PERF_HES_STOPPED)
                return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.h b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.h
index 336878a5d205..3abb5f5cccc8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.h
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ enum pt_capabilities {
 struct pt_pmu {
        struct pmu              pmu;
        u32                     caps[PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM * PT_CPUID_LEAVES];
+       bool                    vmx;
 };
 
 /**
@@ -107,10 +108,12 @@ struct pt_buffer {
  * struct pt - per-cpu pt context
  * @handle:    perf output handle
  * @handle_nmi:        do handle PT PMI on this cpu, there's an active event
+ * @vmx_on:    1 if VMX is ON on this cpu
  */
 struct pt {
        struct perf_output_handle handle;
        int                     handle_nmi;
+       int                     vmx_on;
 };
 
 #endif /* __INTEL_PT_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
index 70c93f9b03ac..1705c9d75e44 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
@@ -718,6 +718,7 @@ static int __init rapl_pmu_init(void)
                break;
        case 60: /* Haswell */
        case 69: /* Haswell-Celeron */
+       case 70: /* Haswell GT3e */
        case 61: /* Broadwell */
        case 71: /* Broadwell-H */
                rapl_cntr_mask = RAPL_IDX_HSW;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h 
b/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h
index 5a2ed3ed2f26..f353061bba1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h
@@ -285,6 +285,10 @@ static inline void perf_events_lapic_init(void)    { }
 static inline void perf_check_microcode(void) { }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ extern void intel_pt_handle_vmx(int on);
+#endif
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD)
  extern void amd_pmu_enable_virt(void);
  extern void amd_pmu_disable_virt(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index ee1c8a93871c..133679d520af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -3103,6 +3103,8 @@ static __init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void)
 
 static void kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 addr)
 {
+       intel_pt_handle_vmx(1);
+
        asm volatile (ASM_VMX_VMXON_RAX
                        : : "a"(&addr), "m"(addr)
                        : "memory", "cc");
@@ -3172,6 +3174,8 @@ static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
 static void kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void)
 {
        asm volatile (__ex(ASM_VMX_VMXOFF) : : : "cc");
+
+       intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
 }
 
 static void hardware_disable(void)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 52bedc5a5aaa..4e2ebf6f2f1f 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table 
*table, int write,
        if (ret || !write)
                return ret;
 
-       if (sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 100) {
+       if (sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 100 ||
+           sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 0) {
                printk(KERN_WARNING
                       "perf: Dynamic interrupt throttling disabled, can hang 
your system!\n");
                WRITE_ONCE(perf_sample_allowed_ns, 0);
@@ -1105,6 +1106,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
  * function.
  *
  * Lock order:
+ *    cred_guard_mutex
  *     task_struct::perf_event_mutex
  *       perf_event_context::mutex
  *         perf_event::child_mutex;
@@ -3420,7 +3422,6 @@ static struct task_struct *
 find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
 {
        struct task_struct *task;
-       int err;
 
        rcu_read_lock();
        if (!vpid)
@@ -3434,16 +3435,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
        if (!task)
                return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
 
-       /* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
-       err = -EACCES;
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
-               goto errout;
-
        return task;
-errout:
-       put_task_struct(task);
-       return ERR_PTR(err);
-
 }
 
 /*
@@ -8413,6 +8405,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
        get_online_cpus();
 
+       if (task) {
+               err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+               if (err)
+                       goto err_cpus;
+
+               /*
+                * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+                *
+                * We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential
+                * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
+                * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
+                * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
+                */
+               err = -EACCES;
+               if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+                       goto err_cred;
+       }
+
        if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)
                cgroup_fd = pid;
 
@@ -8420,7 +8430,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
                                 NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
        if (IS_ERR(event)) {
                err = PTR_ERR(event);
-               goto err_cpus;
+               goto err_cred;
        }
 
        if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
@@ -8479,11 +8489,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
                goto err_context;
        }
 
-       if (task) {
-               put_task_struct(task);
-               task = NULL;
-       }
-
        /*
         * Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
         */
@@ -8581,6 +8586,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
        WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
 
+       /*
+        * This is the point on no return; we cannot fail hereafter. This is
+        * where we start modifying current state.
+        */
+
        if (move_group) {
                /*
                 * See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
@@ -8652,6 +8662,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
                mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
        mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
 
+       if (task) {
+               mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+               put_task_struct(task);
+       }
+
        put_online_cpus();
 
        mutex_lock(&current->perf_event_mutex);
@@ -8684,6 +8699,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
         */
        if (!event_file)
                free_event(event);
+err_cred:
+       if (task)
+               mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 err_cpus:
        put_online_cpus();
 err_task:
@@ -8968,6 +8986,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct 
task_struct *child, int ctxn)
 
 /*
  * When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events.
+ *
+ * Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from
+ * install_exec_creds().
  */
 void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
 {

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