On Tue, Aug 26, 2025 at 01:29:55PM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
> Hi Mickaël
>
> On Tue, Aug 26, 2025 at 5:39 AM Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 10:57:57AM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > > Hi Mickaël
> > >
> > > On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 2:31 AM Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Sun, Aug 24, 2025 at 11:04:03AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > > > On Sun, Aug 24, 2025 at 4:03 AM Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Fri, Aug 22, 2025 at 09:45:32PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 22, 2025 at 7:08 PM Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net>
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > Add a new O_DENY_WRITE flag usable at open time and on opened
> > > > > > > > file (e.g.
> > > > > > > > passed file descriptors). This changes the state of the opened
> > > > > > > > file by
> > > > > > > > making it read-only until it is closed. The main use case is
> > > > > > > > for script
> > > > > > > > interpreters to get the guarantee that script' content cannot
> > > > > > > > be altered
> > > > > > > > while being read and interpreted. This is useful for generic
> > > > > > > > distros
> > > > > > > > that may not have a write-xor-execute policy. See commit
> > > > > > > > a5874fde3c08
> > > > > > > > ("exec: Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2)")
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Both execve(2) and the IOCTL to enable fsverity can already set
> > > > > > > > this
> > > > > > > > property on files with deny_write_access(). This new
> > > > > > > > O_DENY_WRITE make
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The kernel actually tried to get rid of this behavior on execve()
> > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > commit 2a010c41285345da60cece35575b4e0af7e7bf44.; but sadly that
> > > > > > > had
> > > > > > > to be reverted in commit 3b832035387ff508fdcf0fba66701afc78f79e3d
> > > > > > > because it broke userspace assumptions.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Oh, good to know.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > it widely available. This is similar to what other OSs may
> > > > > > > > provide
> > > > > > > > e.g., opening a file with only FILE_SHARE_READ on Windows.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > We used to have the analogous mmap() flag MAP_DENYWRITE, and that
> > > > > > > was
> > > > > > > removed for security reasons; as
> > > > > > > https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mmap.2.html says:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > | MAP_DENYWRITE
> > > > > > > | This flag is ignored. (Long ago—Linux 2.0 and
> > > > > > > earlier—it
> > > > > > > | signaled that attempts to write to the underlying
> > > > > > > file
> > > > > > > | should fail with ETXTBSY. But this was a source
> > > > > > > of denial-
> > > > > > > | of-service attacks.)"
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > It seems to me that the same issue applies to your patch - it
> > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > allow unprivileged processes to essentially lock files such that
> > > > > > > other
> > > > > > > processes can't write to them anymore. This might allow
> > > > > > > unprivileged
> > > > > > > users to prevent root from updating config files or stuff like
> > > > > > > that if
> > > > > > > they're updated in-place.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Yes, I agree, but since it is the case for executed files I though
> > > > > > it
> > > > > > was worth starting a discussion on this topic. This new flag could
> > > > > > be
> > > > > > restricted to executable files, but we should avoid system-wide
> > > > > > locks
> > > > > > like this. I'm not sure how Windows handle these issues though.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Anyway, we should rely on the access control policy to control
> > > > > > write and
> > > > > > execute access in a consistent way (e.g. write-xor-execute).
> > > > > > Thanks for
> > > > > > the references and the background!
> > > > >
> > > > > I'm confused. I understand that there are many contexts in which one
> > > > > would want to prevent execution of unapproved content, which might
> > > > > include preventing a given process from modifying some code and then
> > > > > executing it.
> > > > >
> > > > > I don't understand what these deny-write features have to do with it.
> > > > > These features merely prevent someone from modifying code *that is
> > > > > currently in use*, which is not at all the same thing as preventing
> > > > > modifying code that might get executed -- one can often modify
> > > > > contents *before* executing those contents.
> > > >
> > > > The order of checks would be:
> > > > 1. open script with O_DENY_WRITE
> > > > 2. check executability with AT_EXECVE_CHECK
> > > > 3. read the content and interpret it
> > > >
> > > I'm not sure about the O_DENY_WRITE approach, but the problem is worth
> > > solving.
> > >
> > > AT_EXECVE_CHECK is not just for scripting languages. It could also
> > > work with bytecodes like Java, for example. If we let the Java runtime
> > > call AT_EXECVE_CHECK before loading the bytecode, the LSM could
> > > develop a policy based on that.
> >
> > Sure, I'm using "script" to make it simple, but this applies to other
> > use cases.
> >
> That makes sense.
>
> > >
> > > > The deny-write feature was to guarantee that there is no race condition
> > > > between step 2 and 3. All these checks are supposed to be done by a
> > > > trusted interpreter (which is allowed to be executed). The
> > > > AT_EXECVE_CHECK call enables the caller to know if the kernel (and
> > > > associated security policies) allowed the *current* content of the file
> > > > to be executed. Whatever happen before or after that (wrt.
> > > > O_DENY_WRITE) should be covered by the security policy.
> > > >
> > > Agree, the race problem needs to be solved in order for AT_EXECVE_CHECK.
> > >
> > > Enforcing non-write for the path that stores scripts or bytecodes can
> > > be challenging due to historical or backward compatibility reasons.
> > > Since AT_EXECVE_CHECK provides a mechanism to check the file right
> > > before it is used, we can assume it will detect any "problem" that
> > > happened before that, (e.g. the file was overwritten). However, that
> > > also imposes two additional requirements:
> > > 1> the file doesn't change while AT_EXECVE_CHECK does the check.
> >
> > This is already the case, so any kind of LSM checks are good.
> >
> May I ask how this is done? some code in do_open_execat() does this ?
> Apologies if this is a basic question.
do_open_execat() calls exe_file_deny_write_access()
>
> > > 2>The file content kept by the process remains unchanged after passing
> > > the AT_EXECVE_CHECK.
> >
> > The goal of this patch was to avoid such race condition in the case
> > where executable files can be updated. But in most cases it should not
> > be a security issue (because processes allowed to write to executable
> > files should be trusted), but this could still lead to bugs (because of
> > inconsistent file content, half-updated).
> >
> There is also a time gap between:
> a> the time of AT_EXECVE_CHECK
> b> the time that the app opens the file for execution.
> right ? another potential attack path (though this is not the case I
> mentioned previously).
As explained in the documentation, to avoid this specific race
condition, interpreters should open the script once, check the FD with
AT_EXECVE_CHECK, and then read the content with the same FD.
>
> For the case I mentioned previously, I have to think more if the race
> condition is a bug or security issue.
> IIUC, two solutions are discussed so far:
> 1> the process could write to fs to update the script. However, for
> execution, the process still uses the copy that passed the
> AT_EXECVE_CHECK. (snapshot solution by Andy Lutomirski)
Yes, the snapshot solution would be the best, but I guess it would rely
on filesystems to support this feature.
> or 2> the process blocks the write while opening the file as read only
> and executing the script. (this seems to be the approach of this
> patch).
Yes, and this is not something we want anymore.
>
> I wonder if there are other ideas.
I don't see other efficient ways do give the same guarantees.
