On IMA policy update, if a measure rule exists in the policy,
IMA_MEASURE is set for ima_policy_flags which makes the violation_check
variable always true. Coupled with a no-action on MAY_READ for a
FILE_CHECK call, we're always taking the inode_lock().
This becomes a performance problem for extremely heavy read-only workloads.
Therefore, prevent this only in the case there's no action to be taken.
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <f...@cloudflare.com>
---
Changes since v2:
- s/mask & MAY_WRITE/file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE/
Changes since v1:
- Add MAY_WRITE && action check to violation_check to avoid MAY_READ
only situations
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9b87556b03a7..bc453f5a7531 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -237,7 +237,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const
struct cred *cred,
&allowed_algos);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
- (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
+ (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE) &&
+ ((action & IMA_MEASURE) ||
+ (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)));
if (!action && !violation_check)
return 0;
--
2.43.0
