> The point of the additional file is to leave little room for anything else. > Regarding the FAT place: Assuming the CD ends up on an infected machine, or > falls into the wrong hands ( example: you want to make your client an offer > on a CD, but you do not wish to give the client info about other offers you > made, in this case the wrong hands are exactly the hands the CD goes to), > the infected internal machine and the infected external machine agree on the > interpretation of the extra space in the table sectors, and may communicate > information through it.
Let's be clear about one thing. What is the primary concern: preventing malware from spreading or preventing information from leaking? Depending on the answer some of the responses you've got may be more relevant than others. E.g., I think that Shachar's comment about FAT tables is correct in the context of malware propagation. If catching steganographic messages is the point (as, e.g., I understood the problem) then custom filesystem metadata is as good a channel as any. I liked the idea of printing the stuff and OCRing it back, by the way. A low tech / dead tree step in the middle is a good way to sterilize bits. ;-) -- Oleg Goldshmidt | p...@goldshmidt.org _______________________________________________ Linux-il mailing list Linux-il@cs.huji.ac.il http://mailman.cs.huji.ac.il/mailman/listinfo/linux-il
