Dear,

On Thu, Nov 07, 2024 at 01:52:33PM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Thu, 7 Nov 2024 16:41:02 -0500 Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 07, 2024 at 11:29:42AM -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> > > On Wed, 6 Nov 2024 04:36:04 -0500 Hyunwoo Kim wrote:  
> > > > When hvs is released, there is a possibility that vsk->trans may not
> > > > be initialized to NULL, which could lead to a dangling pointer.
> > > > This issue is resolved by initializing vsk->trans to NULL.
> > > > 
> > > > Fixes: ae0078fcf0a5 ("hv_sock: implements Hyper-V transport for Virtual 
> > > > Sockets (AF_VSOCK)")
> > > > Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org  
> > > 
> > > I don't see the v1 on netdev@, nor a link to it in the change log
> > > so I may be missing the context, but the commit message is a bit
> > > sparse.
> > > 
> > > The stable and Fixes tags indicate this is a fix. But the commit
> > > message reads like currently no such crash is observed, quote:
> > > 
> > >                           which could lead to a dangling pointer.
> > >                                 ^^^^^
> > >                                      ?
> > > 
> > > Could someone clarify?  
> > 
> > I think it's just an accent, in certain languages/cultures expressing
> > uncertainty is considered polite. Should be "can".
> 
> You're probably right, the issue perhaps isn't the phrasing as much 
> as the lack of pointing out the code path in which the dangling pointer
> would be deferenced.  Hyunwoo Kim, can you provide one?

This is a potential issue.

Initially, I reported a patch for a dangling pointer in 
virtio_transport_destruct() within virtio_transport_common.c to the security 
team.
The vulnerability in virtio_transport_destruct() was actually exploited for 
root privilege escalation, and its exploitability was confirmed (Google 
kernelCTF). 
Afterward, the maintainers recommended patching the hvs_destruct() function, 
which 
has a similar form to virtio_transport_destruct(), so I created and submitted 
this patch. 
Unlike virtio_transport_destruct(), this has not been actually triggered, so 
there 
is no call stack available.

However, I still believe it’s good to patch it since it is a potential issue.
Additionally, the v1 patch only exists in the security mailing list, which is 
why it might not be visible.

Best Regards,
Hyunwoo Kim

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