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• • [PATCH] mseal: remove can_do_mseal jeffxu
  • Re: [PATCH] mseal: remove can_do_mseal Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH] mseal: remove can_do_mseal Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH] mseal: remove can_do_mseal Jeff Xu
• [PATCH] fortify: Use __struct_size replace __member_size 15074444048
  • Re: [PATCH] fortify: Use __struct_size replace __member_size Kees Cook
• Re: [PATCH v3] PCI/sysfs: Change read permissions for VPD attributes Bjorn Helgaas
  • Re: [PATCH v3] PCI/sysfs: Change read permissions for VPD attributes Leon Romanovsky
• [PATCH] net: wireless: sme: Initialize n_channels before accessing channels in cfg80211_conn_scan Haoyu Li
  • Re: [PATCH] net: wireless: sme: Initialize n_channels before accessing channels in cfg80211_conn_scan Johannes Berg
  • Re: [PATCH] net: wireless: sme: Initialize n_channels before accessing channels in cfg80211_conn_scan Gustavo A. R. Silva
  • Re: [PATCH] net: wireless: sme: Initialize n_channels before accessing channels in cfg80211_conn_scan Johannes Berg
• [PATCH] drivers: clk: clk-en7523.c: Initialize num before accessing hws in en7523_register_clocks Haoyu Li
  • Re: [PATCH] drivers: clk: clk-en7523.c: Initialize num before accessing hws in en7523_register_clocks Stephen Boyd
• [PATCH] drivers: gpio: gpio-ljca: Initialize num before accessing item in ljca_gpio_config Haoyu Li
  • Re: [PATCH] drivers: gpio: gpio-ljca: Initialize num before accessing item in ljca_gpio_config Bartosz Golaszewski
• [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Ze Zuo
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Matthew Wilcox
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. zuoze
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. zuoze
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Kefeng Wang
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Kefeng Wang
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Kefeng Wang
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Matthew Wilcox
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. zuoze
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. zuoze
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Matthew Wilcox
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. zuoze
  • Re: [PATCH -next] mm: usercopy: add a debugfs interface to bypass the vmalloc check. Uladzislau Rezki
• [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Aleksa Sarai
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Christian Brauner
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Linus Torvalds
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Christian Brauner
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Linus Torvalds
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Christian Brauner
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Mateusz Guzik
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Linus Torvalds
• [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated Linus Torvalds
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated Linus Torvalds
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated Linus Torvalds
  • RE: [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated David Laight
  • Re: [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated Jens Axboe
• GPM & Emacs broken in Linux 6.7 -- ok to relax check? Jared Finder
  • Re: GPM & Emacs broken in Linux 6.7 -- ok to relax check? Günther Noack
  • Re: GPM & Emacs broken in Linux 6.7 -- ok to relax check? Jared Finder
  • Re: GPM & Emacs broken in Linux 6.7 -- ok to relax check? Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: GPM & Emacs broken in Linux 6.7 -- ok to relax check? Hanno Böck
  • Re: GPM & Emacs broken in Linux 6.7 -- ok to relax check? Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH v4 0/1] Seal system mappings jeffxu
  • [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings jeffxu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Matthew Wilcox
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Benjamin Berg
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Benjamin Berg
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Andrei Vagin
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Andrei Vagin
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Liam R. Howlett
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Andrei Vagin
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Liam R. Howlett
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Johannes Berg
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Matthew Wilcox
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Benjamin Berg
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Pedro Falcato
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings enh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Liam R. Howlett
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings enh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Liam R. Howlett
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings enh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Vlastimil Babka
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings enh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Matthew Wilcox
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings enh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Thomas Weißschuh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings enh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Thomas Weißschuh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings enh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Thomas Weißschuh
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Jeff Xu
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Christoph Hellwig
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Heiko Carstens
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v4 0/1] Seal system mappings Lorenzo Stoakes
  • Re: [PATCH v4 0/1] Seal system mappings Jeff Xu
• Re: korg-clang-19-lkftconfig-hardening: TI x15 board - PC is at edma_probe (drivers/dma/ti/edma.c Nathan Chancellor
  • Re: korg-clang-19-lkftconfig-hardening: TI x15 board - PC is at edma_probe (drivers/dma/ti/edma.c Naresh Kamboju
• [PATCH] net: mac80211: cfg: Initialize cnt before accessing elem in ieee80211_copy_mbssid_beacon Haoyu Li
• [PATCH] net: mac80211: cfg: Initialize cnt before accessing elem Haoyu Li
  • Re: [PATCH] net: mac80211: cfg: Initialize cnt before accessing elem Gustavo A. R. Silva
• [PATCH v3 3/3] dmapool: Use xarray for vaddr-to-block lookup Brian Johannesmeyer
  • [PATCH v3 0/3] dmapool: Mitigate dev-controllable mem. corruption Brian Johannesmeyer
  • [PATCH v3 2/3] dmapool: Use pool_find_block() in pool_block_err() Brian Johannesmeyer
  • [PATCH v3 1/3] dmapool: Move pool metadata into non-DMA memory Brian Johannesmeyer
• Re: [RFC 1/1] swiotlb: Replace BUG_ON() with graceful error handling Brian Johannesmeyer
• Re: [RFC 0/1] swiotlb: Mitigate potential DoS caused by BUG_ON() Brian Johannesmeyer
  • Re: [RFC 0/1] swiotlb: Mitigate potential DoS caused by BUG_ON() Robin Murphy
• Re: [PATCH] Fix a potential abuse of seq_printf() format string in drivers Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] Fix a potential abuse of seq_printf() format string in drivers Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: [PATCH] Fix a potential abuse of seq_printf() format string in drivers Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] Fix a potential abuse of seq_printf() format string in drivers Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH][next] ext4: avoid dozens of -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings Gustavo A. R. Silva
  • Re: [PATCH][next] ext4: avoid dozens of -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings Theodore Ts'o
  • Re: [PATCH][next] ext4: avoid dozens of -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings Gustavo A. R. Silva
  • Re: [PATCH][next] ext4: avoid dozens of -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings Theodore Ts'o
• [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Brian Johannesmeyer
  • [RFC v2 1/2] dmapool: Move pool metadata into non-DMA memory Brian Johannesmeyer
  • Re: [RFC v2 1/2] dmapool: Move pool metadata into non-DMA memory Christoph Hellwig
  • Re: [RFC v2 1/2] dmapool: Move pool metadata into non-DMA memory Brian Johannesmeyer
  • Re: [RFC v2 1/2] dmapool: Move pool metadata into non-DMA memory Christoph Hellwig
  • Re: [RFC v2 1/2] dmapool: Move pool metadata into non-DMA memory Brian Johannesmeyer
  • [RFC v2 2/2] dmapool: Use pool_find_block() in pool_block_err() Brian Johannesmeyer
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Greg KH
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Brian Johannesmeyer
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Christoph Hellwig
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Keith Busch
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Keith Busch
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Brian Johannesmeyer
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Keith Busch
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Brian Johannesmeyer
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Keith Busch
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Brian Johannesmeyer
  • Re: [RFC v2 0/2] dmapool: Mitigate device-controllable mem. corruption Brian Johannesmeyer
• [PATCH v2 linux-next 0/2] lib/string_choices: Sorting function order R Sundar
  • [PATCH v2 linux-next 1/2] lib/string_choices: Rearrange functions in sorted order R Sundar
  • Re: [PATCH v2 linux-next 1/2] lib/string_choices: Rearrange functions in sorted order Larysa Zaremba
  • Re: [PATCH v2 linux-next 1/2] lib/string_choices: Rearrange functions in sorted order R Sundar
  • Re: (subset) [PATCH v2 linux-next 1/2] lib/string_choices: Rearrange functions in sorted order Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v2 linux-next 2/2] lib/string_choices: Add str_locked_unlocked()/str_unlocked_locked() helper R Sundar
  • Re: [PATCH v2 linux-next 0/2] lib/string_choices: Sorting function order Andy Shevchenko
  • Re: [PATCH v2 linux-next 0/2] lib/string_choices: Sorting function order Andy Shevchenko
• [PATCH][next] fs: nfs: acl: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warning Gustavo A. R. Silva
• [PATCH] overflow: improve size_add/mul for 32bit systems Dan Carpenter
  • Re: [PATCH] overflow: improve size_add/mul for 32bit systems Dan Carpenter
  • Re: [PATCH] overflow: improve size_add/mul for 32bit systems kernel test robot
  • Re: [PATCH] overflow: improve size_add/mul for 32bit systems kernel test robot
  • Re: [PATCH] overflow: improve size_add/mul for 32bit systems kernel test robot
• [PATCH] smb: client: memcpy() with surrounding object base address Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] smb: client: memcpy() with surrounding object base address Gustavo A. R. Silva
  • Re: [PATCH] smb: client: memcpy() with surrounding object base address Steve French
• [PATCH] pinctrl: airoha: Use unsigned long for bit search Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] pinctrl: airoha: Use unsigned long for bit search AngeloGioacchino Del Regno
  • Re: [PATCH] pinctrl: airoha: Use unsigned long for bit search Linus Walleij
• [PATCH] lib: stackinit: Hide never-taken branch from compiler Kees Cook
• Re: [PATCH] wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: Fix __counted_by usage in cfg80211_wowlan_nd_* Kees Cook
• [PATCH] mm: Handle compound pages better in __dump_page() Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] mm: Handle compound pages better in __dump_page() Matthew Wilcox
  • Re: [PATCH] mm: Handle compound pages better in __dump_page() Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] mm: Handle compound pages better in __dump_page() Matthew Wilcox
• [PATCH] ovl: Check for NULL OVL_E() results Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] ovl: Check for NULL OVL_E() results Amir Goldstein
  • Re: [PATCH] ovl: Check for NULL OVL_E() results kernel test robot
• [PATCH] Input: ads7846 - Expand xfer array to match usage Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] Input: ads7846 - Expand xfer array to match usage Marek Vasut
  • Re: [PATCH] Input: ads7846 - Expand xfer array to match usage Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] Input: ads7846 - Expand xfer array to match usage Dmitry Torokhov
• [PATCH] sctp: Replace zero-length array with flexible array member Thorsten Blum
  • Re: [PATCH] sctp: Replace zero-length array with flexible array member Kees Cook
• [PATCH 0/3] UAPI: ethtool: Avoid flex-array in struct ethtool_link_settings Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 1/3] Revert "net: ethtool: Avoid thousands of -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings" Kees Cook

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