Previously, file operations on a file-backed mount used the current
process' credentials to access the backing FD. Attempting to do so on
Android lead to SELinux denials, as ACL rules on the backing file (e.g.
/system/apex/foo.apex) is restricted to a small set of process.
Arguably, this error is redundant and leaking implementation details, as
access to files on a mount is already ACL'ed by path.

Instead, override to use the opener's cred when accessing the backing
file. This makes the behavior similar to a loop-backed mount, which
uses kworker cred when accessing the backing file and does not cause
SELinux denials.

Signed-off-by: Tatsuyuki Ishi <ishitatsuy...@google.com>
---
 fs/erofs/fileio.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/erofs/fileio.c b/fs/erofs/fileio.c
index 
7d81f504bff08f3d5c5d44d131460df5c3e7847d..df5cc63f2c01eb5e7ec4afab9e054ea12cea7175
 100644
--- a/fs/erofs/fileio.c
+++ b/fs/erofs/fileio.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static void erofs_fileio_ki_complete(struct kiocb *iocb, long 
ret)
 
 static void erofs_fileio_rq_submit(struct erofs_fileio_rq *rq)
 {
+       const struct cred *old_cred;
        struct iov_iter iter;
        int ret;
 
@@ -60,7 +61,9 @@ static void erofs_fileio_rq_submit(struct erofs_fileio_rq *rq)
                rq->iocb.ki_flags = IOCB_DIRECT;
        iov_iter_bvec(&iter, ITER_DEST, rq->bvecs, rq->bio.bi_vcnt,
                      rq->bio.bi_iter.bi_size);
+       old_cred = override_creds(rq->iocb.ki_filp->f_cred);
        ret = vfs_iocb_iter_read(rq->iocb.ki_filp, &rq->iocb, &iter);
+       revert_creds(old_cred);
        if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED)
                erofs_fileio_ki_complete(&rq->iocb, ret);
 }

---
base-commit: cd2e103d57e5615f9bb027d772f93b9efd567224
change-id: 20250612-b4-erofs-impersonate-d6c2926c56ca

Best regards,
-- 
Tatsuyuki Ishi <ishitatsuy...@google.com>


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