On 10/1/18 5:54 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> LoadPin's "enable" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
> or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
> enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
> (for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
> is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue

ISTB:             when "enforcing" is set).  ??

> to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
> centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
> its enforcement).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <ca...@schaufler-ca.com>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johan...@canonical.com>
> ---
>  security/loadpin/Kconfig   |  4 ++--
>  security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
>  2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
> index dd01aa91e521..8653608a3693 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
> @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ config SECURITY_LOADPIN
>         have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as
>         dm-verity or a CDROM.
>  
> -config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED
> +config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCING
>       bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot"
>       depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN
>       help
>         If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not
>         selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter
> -       "loadpin.enabled=1".
> +       "loadpin.enforcing=1".
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index 0716af28808a..d8a68a6f6fef 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file 
> *file, char *operation)
>       kfree(pathname);
>  }
>  
> -static int enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED);
> +static int enforcing = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCING);
>  static struct super_block *pinned_root;
>  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
>  
> @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = {
>  
>  static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
>       {
> -             .procname       = "enabled",
> -             .data           = &enabled,
> +             .procname       = "enforcing",
> +             .data           = &enforcing,
>               .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
>               .mode           = 0644,
>               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block 
> *mnt_sb)
>                                          loadpin_sysctl_table))
>                       pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
>               else
> -                     pr_info("load pinning can be disabled.\n");
> +                     pr_info("enforcement can be disabled.\n");
>       } else
>               pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
>  }
> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum 
> kernel_read_file_id id)
>  
>       /* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
>       if (!file) {
> -             if (!enabled) {
> +             if (!enforcing) {
>                       report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
>                       return 0;
>               }
> @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum 
> kernel_read_file_id id)
>                * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
>                * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
>                * failures before we have announced that pinning is
> -              * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic.
> +              * enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic.
>                */
>               spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
>               check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root);
> @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum 
> kernel_read_file_id id)
>       }
>  
>       if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) {
> -             if (unlikely(!enabled)) {
> +             if (unlikely(!enforcing)) {
>                       report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored");
>                       return 0;
>               }
> @@ -186,10 +186,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] 
> __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  
>  void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
>  {
> -     pr_info("ready to pin (currently %sabled)", enabled ? "en" : "dis");
> +     pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
> +             enforcing ? "" : "not ");
>       security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
>  }
>  
>  /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
> -module_param(enabled, int, 0);
> -MODULE_PARM_DESC(enabled, "Pin module/firmware loading (default: true)");
> +module_param(enforcing, int, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforcing, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
> 


-- 
~Randy

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