On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 2:22 PM, Andy Lutomirski <l...@amacapital.net> wrote: > On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 7:02 PM, Eric W. Biederman > <ebied...@xmission.com> wrote: >> Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> writes: >> >>> There continues to be unexpected side-effects and security exposures >>> via CLONE_NEWUSER. For many end-users running distro kernels with >>> CONFIG_USER_NS enabled, there is no way to disable this feature when >>> desired. As such, this creates a sysctl to restrict CLONE_NEWUSER so >>> admins not running containers or Chrome can avoid the risks of this >>> feature. >> >> I don't actually think there do continue to be unexpected side-effects >> and security exposures with CLONE_NEWUSER. It takes a while for all of >> the fixes to trickle out to distros. At most what I have seen recently >> are problems with other kernel interfaces being amplified with user >> namespaces. AKA the current mess with devpts, and the unexpected >> issues with bind mounts in mount namespaces. >> > >> >> So to keep this productive. Please tell me about the threat model >> you envision, and how you envision knobs in the kernel being used to >> counter those threats. > > I consider the ability to use CLONE_NEWUSER to acquire CAP_NET_ADMIN > over /any/ network namespace and to thus access the network > configuration API to be a huge risk. For example, unprivileged users > can program iptables. I'll eat my hat if there are no privilege > escalations in there. (They can't request module loading, but still.)
Should I consider this an Ack for the patch? :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
