Jann Horn <j...@thejh.net> writes: > On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 09:10:07PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> writes: >> >> > Several sysctls expect a state where the highest value (in extra2) is >> > locked once set for that boot. Yama does this, and kptr_restrict should >> > be doing it. This extracts Yama's logic and adds it to the existing >> > proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, taking care to avoid the simple boolean >> > states (which do not get locked). Since Yama wants to be checking a >> > different capability, we build wrappers for both cases (CAP_SYS_ADMIN >> > and CAP_SYS_PTRACE). >> >> Sigh this sysctl appears susceptible to known attacks. >> >> In my quick skim I believe this sysctl implementation that checks >> capabilities is susceptible to attacks where the already open file >> descriptor is set as stdout on a setuid root application. >> >> Can we come up with an interface that isn't exploitable by an >> application that will act as a setuid cat? > > Adding the struct file * to the parameters of all proc_handler > functions would work, right? (Or just filp->f_cred? That would be > less generic.) > > A quick grep says that's just about 160 functions that'll need to > be changed. :/
Yep. That is about the size of it. file * used to be passed to the sysctl methods but it was removed several years ago because no one was using it. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
