On 11 January 2017 at 12:08, Herbert Xu <[email protected]> wrote:
> The kernel on x86-64 cannot use gcc attribute align to align to
> a 16-byte boundary. This patch reverts to the old way of aligning
> it by hand.
>
> Incidentally the old way was actually broken in not allocating
> enough space and would silently corrupt the stack. This patch
> fixes it by allocating an extra 8 bytes.
>
I think the old code was fine, actually:
u32 *state, state_buf[16 + (CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN / sizeof(u32)) - 1];
ends up allocating 16 + 3 *words* == 64 + 12 bytes , which given the
guaranteed 4 byte alignment is sufficient for ensuring the pointer can
be 16 byte aligned.
So [16 + 2] should be sufficient here
> Fixes: 9ae433bc79f9 ("crypto: chacha20 - convert generic and...")
> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c
> index 78f75b0..054306d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c
> @@ -67,10 +67,13 @@ static int chacha20_simd(struct skcipher_request *req)
> {
> struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
> struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
> - u32 state[16] __aligned(CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN);
> + u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 8] __aligned(8);
> struct skcipher_walk walk;
> int err;
>
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
> + state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN);
> +
> if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd())
> return crypto_chacha20_crypt(req);
>
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
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