Maiores informacoes: http://www.sans.org/y2k/lion.htm


      Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2001  8:45:08 -0700 (MST)
      From: The SANS Institute <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
      Subject: ALERT -  A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE
      INTERNET
      Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
      To: bill maddox (SD443658) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

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      ALERT!  A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET

      March 23, 2001 7:00 AM

      Late last night, the SANS Institute (through its Global
      Incident
      Analysis Center) uncovered a dangerous new worm that appears
      to be
      spreading rapidly across the Internet.  It scans the Internet
      looking
      for Linux computers with a known vulnerability. It infects
      the
      vulnerable machines, steals the password file  (sending it to
      a
      China.com site), installs other hacking tools, and forces the
      newly
      infected machine to begin scanning the Internet looking for
      other
      victims.

      Several experts from the security community worked through
      the night to
      decompose the worm's code and engineer a utility to help you
      discover
      if the Lion worm has affected your organization.

      Updates to this announcement will be posted at the SANS web
      site,
      http://www.sans.org


      DESCRIPTION

      The Lion worm is similar to the Ramen worm. However, this
      worm is
      significantly more dangerous and should be taken very
      seriously.  It
      infects Linux machines running the BIND DNS server.  It is
      known to
      infect bind version(s) 8.2, 8.2-P1, 8.2.1, 8.2.2-Px, and all
      8.2.3-betas. The specific vulnerability used by the worm to
      exploit
      machines is the TSIG vulnerability that was reported on
      January 29,
      2001.

      The Lion worm spreads via an application called "randb". 
      Randb scans
      random class B networks probing TCP port 53. Once it hits a
      system, it
      checks to see if it is vulnerable. If so, Lion exploits the
      system using
      an exploit called "name".  It then installs the t0rn rootkit.

      Once Lion has compromised a system, it:

      - - Sends the contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, as well
      as some
      network settings to an address in the china.com domain.
      - - Deletes /etc/hosts.deny, eliminating the host-based
      perimeter
      protection afforded by tcp wrappers.
      - - Installs backdoor root shells on ports 60008/tcp and
      33567/tcp (via
      inetd, see /etc/inetd.conf)
      - - Installs a trojaned version of ssh that listens on
      33568/tcp
      - - Kills Syslogd , so the logging on the system can't be
      trusted
      - - Installs a trojaned version of login
      - - Looks for a hashed password in /etc/ttyhash
      - - /usr/sbin/nscd (the optional Name Service Caching daemon)
      is
      overwritten with a trojaned version of ssh.

      The t0rn rootkit replaces several binaries on the system in
      order to
      stealth itself. Here are the binaries that it replaces:

      du, find, ifconfig, in.telnetd, in.fingerd, login, ls, mjy,
      netstat,
      ps, pstree, top

      - - "Mjy" is a utility for cleaning out log entries, and is
      placed in /bin
      and /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.
      - - in.telnetd is also placed in these directories; its use
      is not known
      at this time. 
      - - A setuid shell is placed in
      /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.x

      DETECTION AND REMOVAL

      We have developed a utility called Lionfind that will detect
      the Lion
      files on an infected system.  Simply download it, uncompress
      it, and
      run lionfind.  This utility will list which of the suspect
      files is on
      the system.

      At this time, Lionfind is not able to remove the virus from
      the system.
      If and when an updated version becomes available (and we
      expect to
      provide one), an announcement will be made at this site.

      Download Lionfind at
      http://www.sans.org/y2k/lionfind-0.1.tar.gz


      REFERENCES

      Further information can be found at:

      http://www.sans.org/current.htm
      http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html, CERT Advisory
      CA-2001-02,
      Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND
      http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/196945 ISC BIND 8 contains
      buffer overflow
      in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code
      http://www.sans.org/y2k/t0rn.htm Information about the t0rn
      rootkit.
      The following vendor update pages may help you in fixing the
      original BIND
      vulnerability:

      Redhat Linux RHSA-2001:007-03 - Bind remote exploit
      http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-007.html
      Debian GNU/Linux DSA-026-1 BIND
      http://www.debian.org/security/2001/dsa-026
      SuSE Linux SuSE-SA:2001:03 - Bind 8 remote root compromise.
      http://www.suse.com/de/support/security/2001_003_bind8_
      txt.txt
      Caldera Linux CSSA-2001-008.0 Bind buffer overflow
      http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.0.txt
      http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.1.txt

      This security advisory was prepared by Matt Fearnow of the
      SANS
      Institute and William Stearns of the Dartmouth Institute for
      Security
      Technology Studies.

      The Lionfind utility was written by William Stearns. William
      is an
      Open-Source developer, enthusiast, and advocate from Vermont,
      USA. His
      day job at the Institute for Security Technology Studies at
      Dartmouth
      College pays him to work on network security and Linux
      projects.

      Also contributing efforts go to Dave Dittrich from the
      University of
      Washington, and Greg Shipley of Neohapsis

      Matt Fearnow
      SANS GIAC Incident Handler

      If you have additional data on this worm or a critical
      quetsion  please
      email [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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