external/curl/CVE-2017-1000254.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++
external/curl/CVE-2018-1000120.patch | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
external/curl/CVE-2018-14618.patch | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
external/curl/UnpackedTarball_curl.mk | 3 +
scripting/source/pyprov/pythonscript.py | 30 +++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
New commits:
commit 27235eb29daaaa3601bd24853fcbd7ee1b255591
Author: Thorsten Behrens <thorsten.behr...@cib.de>
AuthorDate: Mon Sep 10 06:16:58 2018 +0200
Commit: Samuel Mehrbrodt <samuel.mehrbr...@cib.de>
CommitDate: Tue Nov 6 11:35:03 2018 +0100
curl: fix CVE-2017-1000254 & CVE-2018-14618/1000120
* still don't upgrade to new release, no idea how the new windows
build system likes targeting Win XP which is still supported in 5.4
Change-Id: If9c235d2c3e1902f154cae570a9719945112fe33
(cherry picked from commit 8d86210e1d113f5688015ea197d7b04b173899fb)
diff --git a/external/curl/CVE-2017-1000254.patch
b/external/curl/CVE-2017-1000254.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2e2af20f7258
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/curl/CVE-2017-1000254.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 29b251362e1839d7094993edbed8f9467069773f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <dan...@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 00:35:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] FTP: zero terminate the entry path even on bad input
+
+... a single double quote could leave the entry path buffer without a zero
+terminating byte. CVE-2017-1000254
+
+Test 1152 added to verify.
+
+Reported-by: Max Dymond
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20171004.html
+---
+ lib/ftp.c | 7 ++++--
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc | 1 +
+ tests/data/test1152 | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test1152
+
+diff -urN curl.org/lib/ftp.c curl/lib/ftp.c
+--- curl.org/lib/ftp.c 2016-12-19 09:15:11.000000000 +0100
++++ curl/lib/ftp.c 2018-09-10 05:52:32.148633155 +0200
+@@ -2825,6 +2825,7 @@
+ char *ptr=&data->state.buffer[4]; /* start on the first letter */
+ char *dir;
+ char *store;
++ bool entry_extracted = FALSE;
+
+ dir = malloc(nread + 1);
+ if(!dir)
+@@ -2856,7 +2857,7 @@
+ }
+ else {
+ /* end of path */
+- *store = '\0'; /* zero terminate */
++ entry_extracted = TRUE;
+ break; /* get out of this loop */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -2865,7 +2866,9 @@
+ store++;
+ ptr++;
+ }
+-
++ *store = '\0'; /* zero terminate */
++ }
++ if(entry_extracted) {
+ /* If the path name does not look like an absolute path (i.e.: it
+ does not start with a '/'), we probably need some
server-dependent
+ adjustments. For example, this is the case when connecting to
diff --git a/external/curl/CVE-2018-1000120.patch
b/external/curl/CVE-2018-1000120.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6da1b1b3dcce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/curl/CVE-2018-1000120.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From a6ae0fbe9c50733e0f645f5bd16e1db38c592c3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <dan...@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:40:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] FTP: reject path components with control codes
+
+Refuse to operate when given path components featuring byte values lower
+than 32.
+
+Previously, inserting a %00 sequence early in the directory part when
+using the 'singlecwd' ftp method could make curl write a zero byte
+outside of the allocated buffer.
+
+Test case 340 verifies.
+
+CVE-2018-1000120
+Reported-by: Duy Phan Thanh
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-9cd6.html
+---
+ lib/ftp.c | 8 ++++----
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc | 3 +++
+ tests/data/test340 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test340
+
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.c b/lib/ftp.c
+index fec591918..e2cc38b62 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
++++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -3192,11 +3192,11 @@ static CURLcode ftp_done(struct connectdata *conn,
CURLcode status,
+ ftpc->known_filesize = -1;
+ }
+
+ if(!result)
+ /* get the "raw" path */
+- result = Curl_urldecode(data, path_to_use, 0, &path, NULL, FALSE);
++ result = Curl_urldecode(data, path_to_use, 0, &path, NULL, TRUE);
+ if(result) {
+ /* We can limp along anyway (and should try to since we may already be in
+ * the error path) */
+ ftpc->ctl_valid = FALSE; /* mark control connection as bad */
+ connclose(conn, "FTP: out of memory!"); /* mark for connection closure */
+@@ -4153,11 +4153,11 @@ CURLcode ftp_parse_url_path(struct connectdata *conn)
+ dirlen++;
+
+ result = Curl_urldecode(conn->data, slash_pos ? cur_pos : "/",
+ slash_pos ? dirlen : 1,
+ &ftpc->dirs[0], NULL,
+- FALSE);
++ TRUE);
+ if(result) {
+ freedirs(ftpc);
+ return result;
+ }
+ ftpc->dirdepth = 1; /* we consider it to be a single dir */
+@@ -4260,11 +4260,11 @@ CURLcode ftp_parse_url_path(struct connectdata *conn)
+ /* prevpath is "raw" so we convert the input path before we compare the
+ strings */
+ size_t dlen;
+ char *path;
+ CURLcode result =
+- Curl_urldecode(conn->data, data->state.path, 0, &path, &dlen, FALSE);
++ Curl_urldecode(conn->data, data->state.path, 0, &path, &dlen, TRUE);
+ if(result) {
+ freedirs(ftpc);
+ return result;
+ }
+
diff --git a/external/curl/CVE-2018-14618.patch
b/external/curl/CVE-2018-14618.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..40f08e7305c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/curl/CVE-2018-14618.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 57d299a499155d4b327e341c6024e293b0418243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <dan...@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 10:35:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Curl_ntlm_core_mk_nt_hash: return error on too long password
+
+... since it would cause an integer overflow if longer than (max size_t
+/ 2).
+
+This is CVE-2018-14618
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-14618.html
+Closes #2756
+Reported-by: Zhaoyang Wu
+---
+ lib/curl_ntlm_core.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
+index e27cab353c..922e85a926 100644
+--- a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
++++ b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
+@@ -526,6 +526,15 @@
+
+ #endif /* USE_NTLM_V2 && !USE_WINDOWS_SSPI */
+
++#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
++/* some limits.h headers have this defined, some don't */
++#if defined(SIZEOF_SIZE_T) && (SIZEOF_SIZE_T > 4)
++#define SIZE_T_MAX 18446744073709551615U
++#else
++#define SIZE_T_MAX 4294967295U
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Set up nt hashed passwords
+ * @unittest: 1600
+@@ -557,8 +557,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_ntlm_core_mk_nt_hash(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ unsigned char *ntbuffer /* 21 bytes */)
+ {
+ size_t len = strlen(password);
+- unsigned char *pw = malloc(len * 2);
++ unsigned char *pw;
+ CURLcode result;
++ if(len > SIZE_T_MAX/2) /* avoid integer overflow */
++ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++ pw = len ? malloc(len * 2) : strdup("");
+ if(!pw)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+@@ -621,15 +630,6 @@
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+
+-#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
+-/* some limits.h headers have this defined, some don't */
+-#if defined(SIZEOF_SIZE_T) && (SIZEOF_SIZE_T > 4)
+-#define SIZE_T_MAX 18446744073709551615U
+-#else
+-#define SIZE_T_MAX 4294967295U
+-#endif
+-#endif
+-
+ /* This creates the NTLMv2 hash by using NTLM hash as the key and Unicode
+ * (uppercase UserName + Domain) as the data
+ */
diff --git a/external/curl/UnpackedTarball_curl.mk
b/external/curl/UnpackedTarball_curl.mk
index 1179153959a5..88aecc718fb5 100644
--- a/external/curl/UnpackedTarball_curl.mk
+++ b/external/curl/UnpackedTarball_curl.mk
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ $(eval $(call gb_UnpackedTarball_add_patches,curl,\
external/curl/CVE-2017-8816.patch \
external/curl/CVE-2018-1000005.patch \
external/curl/CVE-2018-1000007.patch \
+ external/curl/CVE-2018-14618.patch \
+ external/curl/CVE-2017-1000254.patch \
+ external/curl/CVE-2018-1000120.patch \
))
ifeq ($(SYSTEM_NSS),)
commit 2128cbd13f93bd7e2414a4bf63302735b7b1c04a
Author: Caolán McNamara <caol...@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Thu Oct 18 20:39:23 2018 +0100
Commit: Samuel Mehrbrodt <samuel.mehrbr...@cib.de>
CommitDate: Tue Nov 6 11:34:51 2018 +0100
keep pyuno script processing below base uri
Change-Id: Icc13fb7193fb1e7c50e0df286161a10b4ed636c7
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.libreoffice.org/62173
Reviewed-by: Michael Stahl <michael.st...@cib.de>
Tested-by: Michael Stahl <michael.st...@cib.de>
(cherry picked from commit 34e9072344067010b82124a3a104b20c73da9f0c)
diff --git a/scripting/source/pyprov/pythonscript.py
b/scripting/source/pyprov/pythonscript.py
index a2fc4f055a10..9609b6d94640 100644
--- a/scripting/source/pyprov/pythonscript.py
+++ b/scripting/source/pyprov/pythonscript.py
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import imp
import time
import ast
import platform
+from com.sun.star.uri.RelativeUriExcessParentSegments import RETAIN
try:
unicode
@@ -211,8 +212,33 @@ class MyUriHelper:
def scriptURI2StorageUri( self, scriptURI ):
try:
- myUri = self.m_uriRefFac.parse(scriptURI)
- ret = self.m_baseUri + "/" + myUri.getName().replace( "|", "/" )
+ # base path to the python script location
+ sBaseUri = self.m_baseUri + "/"
+ xBaseUri = self.m_uriRefFac.parse(sBaseUri)
+
+ # path to the .py file + "$functionname, arguments, etc
+ xStorageUri = self.m_uriRefFac.parse(scriptURI)
+ sStorageUri = xStorageUri.getName().replace( "|", "/" );
+
+ # path to the .py file, relative to the base
+ sFileUri = sStorageUri[0:sStorageUri.find("$")]
+ xFileUri = self.m_uriRefFac.parse(sFileUri)
+ if not xFileUri:
+ message = "pythonscript: invalid relative uri '" + sFileUri+
"'"
+ log.debug( message )
+ raise RuntimeException( message )
+
+ # absolute path to the .py file
+ xAbsScriptUri = self.m_uriRefFac.makeAbsolute(xBaseUri, xFileUri,
True, RETAIN)
+ sAbsScriptUri = xAbsScriptUri.getUriReference()
+
+ # ensure py file is under the base path
+ if not sAbsScriptUri.startswith(sBaseUri):
+ message = "pythonscript: storage uri '" + sAbsScriptUri + "'
not in base uri '" + self.m_baseUri + "'"
+ log.debug( message )
+ raise RuntimeException( message )
+
+ ret = sBaseUri + sStorageUri
log.debug( "converting scriptURI="+scriptURI + " to storageURI=" +
ret )
return ret
except UnoException as e:
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