Yes, we can't protect against an arbitrarily broken system. I'm not a good systems administrator. I don't know how to do "please consider hiding it" without breaking something else.
I think pango is faulty; it needs to depend on how cairo was configured, but it is testing how the system is configured. But that's above my pay-grade. I like this change because it's within the part of the world that's currently open to me to possibly (depending on this conversation) change. On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:59 PM, Tor Lillqvist <t...@iki.fi> wrote: >> This is a protection-from-contaminated-system > > But in general, a system can be contaminamed in arbitrary ways. > Should/can we really protect against arbitrary, unknown, ways in which > a system might have been changed by "helpful" 3rd-party software or > misguided sysadmins/users to not correspond to a normal installation > of the OS in question? No, we can't. > > What we should do, IMHO, is to check in our own configure.in if there > is a pkg-config in PATH on a system where one is not expected to be > present (only Mac OS X, I guess?), and in that case emit a warning. > > But wait, we already do that! > > if test $_os = Darwin; then > AC_MSG_CHECKING([for bogus pkg-config]) > if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then > if test "$PKG_CONFIG" = /usr/bin/pkg-config && ls -l > /usr/bin/pkg-config | grep -q Mono.framework; then > AC_MSG_RESULT([yes, from Mono]) > else > AC_MSG_RESULT([yes, from unknown origin]) > fi > AC_MSG_WARN([This might have unexpected consequences, please > consider hiding $PKG_CONFIG]) > echo "Having a $PKG_CONFIG might have unexpected consequences, > please consider hiding it" >>warn > else > AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) > fi > fi > > --tml _______________________________________________ LibreOffice mailing list LibreOffice@lists.freedesktop.org http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/libreoffice
