On Fri, Apr 23, 2010 at 03:46:07PM +0200, Alexander Graf wrote:
>
> On 22.04.2010, at 12:33, Joerg Roedel wrote:
>
> > The patch introducing nested nmi handling had a bug. The
> > check does not belong to enable_nmi_window but must be in
> > nmi_allowed. This patch fixes this.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 16 +++++++++-------
> > 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > index ab78eb8..ec20584 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > @@ -2771,8 +2771,12 @@ static int svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > {
> > struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> > struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
> > - return !(vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK) &&
> > - !(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
> > + int ret;
> > + ret = !(vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK) &&
> > + !(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
> > + ret = ret && gif_set(svm) && nested_svm_nmi(svm);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > }
> >
> > static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > @@ -2841,11 +2845,9 @@ static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > * Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over possible
> > * problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt shadow)
> > */
> > - if (gif_set(svm) && nested_svm_nmi(svm)) {
> > - svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
> > - svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
> > - update_db_intercept(vcpu);
> > - }
> > + svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
> > + svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
> > + update_db_intercept(vcpu);
>
> So we're always messing with the nested guest state when the host
> wants to inject an nmi into the l1 guest? Is that safe?
Why not? We can't inject an NMI directly into L2 if the nested
hypervisor intercepts it.
Joerg
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