This patch adds SMAP handling logic when setting CR4 for guests
Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng...@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index f1e4895..63124a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_smep(struct kvm_vcpu
*vcpu)
return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SMEP));
}
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_smap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
+ return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
+}
+
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_fsgsbase(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 40772ef..33e656c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -3591,14 +3591,15 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu
*vcpu,
}
}
-static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
{
unsigned bit, byte, pfec;
u8 map;
- bool fault, x, w, u, wf, uf, ff, smep;
+ bool fault, x, w, u, wf, uf, ff, smep, smap;
smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
+ smap = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
for (byte = 0; byte < ARRAY_SIZE(mmu->permissions); ++byte) {
pfec = byte << 1;
map = 0;
@@ -3617,11 +3618,26 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu
*vcpu,
w |= !is_write_protection(vcpu) && !uf;
/* Disallow supervisor fetches of user code if
cr4.smep */
x &= !(smep && u && !uf);
+
+ /*
+ * SMAP:kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode
+ * mappings should fault. A fault is considered
+ * as a SMAP violation if all of the following
+ * conditions are ture:
+ * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
+ * - An user page is accessed
+ * - !(CPL<3 && X86_EFLAGS_AC is set)
+ * - Page fault in kernel mode
+ */
+ smap = smap && u && !uf &&
+ !((kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) < 3) &&
+ ((kvm_x86_ops->get_rflags(vcpu) &
+ X86_EFLAGS_AC) == 1));
} else
/* Not really needed: no U/S accesses on ept */
u = 1;
- fault = (ff && !x) || (uf && !u) || (wf && !w);
+ fault = (ff && !x) || (uf && !u) || (wf && !w) || smap;
map |= fault << bit;
}
mmu->permissions[byte] = map;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 2926152..8820f78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ int handle_mmio_page_fault_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64
addr, bool direct);
void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context);
void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context,
bool execonly);
+void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+ bool ept);
static inline unsigned int kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 4e33b85..f8293fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -630,6 +630,9 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
if (!guest_cpuid_has_smep(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_SMEP))
return 1;
+ if (!guest_cpuid_has_smap(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_SMAP))
+ return 1;
+
if (!guest_cpuid_has_fsgsbase(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_FSGSBASE))
return 1;
@@ -658,6 +661,9 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
(!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+ if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_SMAP)
+ update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, false);
+
if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
--
1.8.3.1
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