On Thu, Sep 25, 2008 at 07:32:55PM +0200, Alexander Graf wrote:
> >This is a big security hole. With this we give the guest access to its
> >own VMCB. The guest can take over or crash the whole host machine by
> >rewriting its VMCB. We should be more selective what we save in the
> >hsave area.
>
> Oh, right. I didn't even think of a case where the nested guest would
> have acvess to the hsave of itself. Since the hsave can never be used
> twice on one vcpu, we could just allocate our own memory for the hsave
> in the vcpu context and leave the nested hsave empty.
I think we could also gain performance by only saving the important
parts of the VMCB and not the whole page.
Joerg
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