On 16-02-03 14:06:25, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and
> the file signature re-appraised, based on policy.  As there is no need to
> preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and
> module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file.
> 
> This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>

Acked-by: Petko Manolov <[email protected]>

> ---
>  security/integrity/iint.c             |  4 ++--
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 35 
> ++++++++++++++++-------------------
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   |  9 ++++-----
>  security/integrity/integrity.h        | 16 ++++------------
>  5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index 8f1ab37..345b759 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
>       iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> -     iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> +     iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
>  }
> @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
>       iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> -     iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> +     iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 0b7134c..a5d2592 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -144,9 +144,10 @@ enum ima_hooks {
>       FILE_CHECK = 1,
>       MMAP_CHECK,
>       BPRM_CHECK,
> +     POST_SETATTR,
>       MODULE_CHECK,
>       FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> -     POST_SETATTR
> +     MAX_CHECK
>  };
>  
>  /* LIM API function definitions */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index cb0d0ff..6b4694a 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -74,13 +74,12 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct 
> integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>               return iint->ima_mmap_status;
>       case BPRM_CHECK:
>               return iint->ima_bprm_status;
> -     case MODULE_CHECK:
> -             return iint->ima_module_status;
> -     case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
> -             return iint->ima_firmware_status;
>       case FILE_CHECK:
> -     default:
> +     case POST_SETATTR:
>               return iint->ima_file_status;
> +     case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
> +     default:
> +             return iint->ima_read_status;
>       }
>  }

I assume you used "case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:" for readability?


> @@ -95,15 +94,14 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct 
> integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>       case BPRM_CHECK:
>               iint->ima_bprm_status = status;
>               break;
> -     case MODULE_CHECK:
> -             iint->ima_module_status = status;
> -             break;
> -     case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
> -             iint->ima_firmware_status = status;
> -             break;
>       case FILE_CHECK:
> -     default:
> +     case POST_SETATTR:
>               iint->ima_file_status = status;
> +             break;
> +     case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
> +     default:
> +             iint->ima_read_status = status;
> +             break;
>       }
>  }
>  
> @@ -117,15 +115,14 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache 
> *iint,
>       case BPRM_CHECK:
>               iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
>               break;
> -     case MODULE_CHECK:
> -             iint->flags |= (IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> -             break;
> -     case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
> -             iint->flags |= (IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> -             break;
>       case FILE_CHECK:
> -     default:
> +     case POST_SETATTR:
>               iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> +             break;
> +     case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
> +     default:
> +             iint->flags |= (IMA_READ_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
> +             break;
>       }
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index cfbe86f..7571ce8 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -300,13 +300,12 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, 
> enum ima_hooks func)
>               return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
>       case BPRM_CHECK:
>               return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
> -     case MODULE_CHECK:
> -             return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE;
> -     case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
> -             return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE;
>       case FILE_CHECK:
> -     default:
> +     case POST_SETATTR:
>               return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
> +     case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
> +     default:
> +             return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
>       }
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index 9a0ea4c..c7a111c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -45,18 +45,12 @@
>  #define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED   0x00000800
>  #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE    0x00001000
>  #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED   0x00002000
> -#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE  0x00004000
> -#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED 0x00008000
> -#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE        0x00010000
> -#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED       0x00020000
> -#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE    0x00040000
> -#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED   0x00080000
> +#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE    0x00004000
> +#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED   0x00008000
>  #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
> -                              IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \
> -                              IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE)
> +                              IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE)
>  #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK        (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | 
> IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
> -                              IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \
> -                              IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED)
> +                              IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED)
>  
>  enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
>       IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
> @@ -111,8 +105,6 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
>       enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
>       enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
>       enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
> -     enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
> -     enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status:4;
>       enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
>       enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
>       struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
> -- 
> 2.1.0
> 
> --
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