------- Comment From cclau...@br.ibm.com 2017-09-27 16:47 EDT-------
(In reply to comment #30)
> Attached is the ESL db update for Canonical's POWER SecureBoot signing key.
> It is signed with Canonical's KEK key, which will be provided to IBM out of
> band to ensure integrity of the delivery channel.

Thanks Andy and Vorlon for the attached files. The kernel appended
signature verified successfully.

We didn't test the Canonical-POWER-SB-20170926.esl.signed file yet.

Questions:

1) The certificate provided contains a 4096-bit key and it was signed
using sha512WithRSAEncryption. We had no problem to use it to verify the
kernel appended signature - the kernel crypto API supports 4096-bit RSA
keys. However, we don't have much space in our keystore and that's why
we prefer to use 2048-bit RSA keys, same as UEFI SecureBoot. Could the
Canonical-POWER-SB-20170926.esl.signed file be regenerated to contain a
certificate that contains a 2048-bit RSA key instead? The certificate
would be signed using sha256WithRSAEncryption.

2) We will need to put in the KEK a certificate that can be used to verify the 
signed ESL db updates provided by Canonical. How does Canonical have provided 
that for UEFI SecureBoot? certificate, ESL (not signed, since PK is not 
provided by Canonical)?
Currently, we are working on the code that will validate/process the 
authenticated variable updates. We will probably start testing it by the end of 
this year.

Thanks,
Claudio

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You received this bug notification because you are a member of Kernel
Packages, which is subscribed to linux-signed in Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1696154

Title:
  [17.10 FEAT] Sign POWER host/NV kernels

Status in Launchpad itself:
  Fix Committed
Status in The Ubuntu-power-systems project:
  In Progress
Status in linux package in Ubuntu:
  In Progress
Status in linux-signed package in Ubuntu:
  In Progress

Bug description:
  Feature Description:

  Sign POWER host and NV kernels with sign-file in anticipation of POWER
  secure boot.  Provide the  associated certificate.  Ideally it would
  be possible to reuse the UEFI shim private key and certificate used to
  sign and verify x86_64 kernels.  More details to follow.  Guest
  kernels will be addressed in a future separate feature request.

  
  Business Case: 

  As a system administrator I want to verify the integrity of my kernels
  so that I can prevent malicious kernels from being executed.

  Use Case:

  Signed POWER kernels will be validated by OPAL as OpenPOWER systems
  boot when keys are properly installed and the system is booted in
  secure mode.

  
  Test Case:

  Sign and install a POWER kernel on an OpenPOWER machine with a
  firmware level that supports secure boot.  Install a PK, distro KEK
  certificat, and distro DB certificate.  Boot the system and verify
  that it will boot the kernel.  Negative tests:  Separately remove the
  signature, install an usigned kernel, and modify the kernel image and
  test that the kernel will not boot.

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