Having reviewed and discussed the changes to grub in the SRU queue, I
have concluded that the grub2 SRU is both insufficient (because upgrade
ordering does not ensure that the update-secureboot-policy command is
available when grub is upgraded) and unnecessary (because shim-signed
should apply the policy itself, so grub doesn't need to).
I am rejecting / removing the grub2 and grub2-signed SRUs for this.
shim-signed needs a reupload, so that it directly calls update-
secureboot-policy in postinst on upgrade - not just when triggered by
another package.
Later, when we are changing grub to refuse to boot kernels whose
signature doesn't verify, we will need to ensure that an appropriate
version of shim-signed is installed first. But that should be done with
a Breaks against older versions of shim, not with conditional postinst
logic.
** Changed in: grub2-signed (Ubuntu Wily)
Status: New => Invalid
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1574727
Title:
[SRU] Enforce using signed kernels and modules on UEFI
Status in dkms package in Ubuntu:
Fix Released
Status in efibootmgr package in Ubuntu:
Fix Released
Status in efivar package in Ubuntu:
Fix Released
Status in grub2 package in Ubuntu:
New
Status in grub2-signed package in Ubuntu:
New
Status in mokutil package in Ubuntu:
Fix Released
Status in shim package in Ubuntu:
New
Status in shim-signed package in Ubuntu:
Fix Released
Status in dkms source package in Precise:
New
Status in efibootmgr source package in Precise:
Invalid
Status in efivar source package in Precise:
Fix Committed
Status in grub2 source package in Precise:
New
Status in grub2-signed source package in Precise:
New
Status in mokutil source package in Precise:
Fix Committed
Status in shim source package in Precise:
New
Status in shim-signed source package in Precise:
Fix Committed
Status in dkms source package in Trusty:
Fix Committed
Status in efibootmgr source package in Trusty:
Invalid
Status in efivar source package in Trusty:
Fix Committed
Status in grub2 source package in Trusty:
Fix Committed
Status in grub2-signed source package in Trusty:
Fix Committed
Status in mokutil source package in Trusty:
Fix Committed
Status in shim source package in Trusty:
New
Status in shim-signed source package in Trusty:
Fix Committed
Status in dkms source package in Wily:
Fix Committed
Status in efibootmgr source package in Wily:
Fix Released
Status in efivar source package in Wily:
Fix Released
Status in grub2 source package in Wily:
New
Status in grub2-signed source package in Wily:
Invalid
Status in mokutil source package in Wily:
Fix Committed
Status in shim source package in Wily:
New
Status in shim-signed source package in Wily:
Fix Committed
Status in dkms source package in Xenial:
Fix Released
Status in efibootmgr source package in Xenial:
Fix Released
Status in efivar source package in Xenial:
Fix Released
Status in grub2 source package in Xenial:
Fix Committed
Status in grub2-signed source package in Xenial:
Fix Committed
Status in mokutil source package in Xenial:
Fix Released
Status in shim source package in Xenial:
New
Status in shim-signed source package in Xenial:
Fix Committed
Bug description:
[Rationale]
Secure Boot is good. We want to be able to validate that as much as possible
of the boot process happens with signed binaries; from our shim (the part that
is loaded by the EFI firmware itself), down to grub2, the kernel, and even
loaded modules.
[Impact]
All our users booting in UEFI; on all supported releases.
[Test cases]
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1GbyQDb4-sRv7OlIpbISiwVJ2ARHP3AkG2HbPTRk7p-E/edit#gid=0
Test cases here are separated by the components that need to be
changed:
= mokutil =
Adding a MOK key:
1) Install system
2) Run 'mokutil --import <file.der>' to import a signing certificate.
3) On reboot; validate MOK prompts for new MOK key to add.
Toggling Secure Boot state:
1) Install system
2) mokutil --enable-validation or mokutil --disable-validation
3) Validate that on reboot MOK prompts to change Secure Boot state.
Listing keys:
1) mokutil --list-enrolled
-- should list keys previously enrolled, and Microsoft keys on systems that
are configured with them for factory Secure Boot.
= efivar =
libefivar0 gets tested via the use of mokutil. Since it is a library
with no directly usable binaries; we rely on mokutil / sbsigntool /
efibootmgr to do testing.
1) Run efibootmgr -v ; verify it lists BootEntries.
2) Run efibootmgr -c -L ubuntu2 -l \\EFI\\ubuntu\\shimx64.efi ; verify that
on reboot; you can get into a boot menu that will list 'ubuntu2', and that
picking that boot entry boots into Ubuntu.
= shim-signed =
1) Install system; upgrade to new packages
1b) Verify /proc/sys/kernel/secure_boot shows 1.
1c) Verify /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled shows 0.
2) Run 'sudo update-secureboot-policy'; validate that it prompts to disable
Secure Boot if it's not already disabled.
3) Run 'sudo update-secureboot-policy'; validate you are not prompted again
to disable Secure Boot.
4) Reboot; follow MOK steps to disable Secure Boot.
4b) Verify /proc/sys/kernel/secure_boot shows 1.
4c) Verify /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled shows 1.
5) Run 'sudo update-secureboot-policy --enable'; validate you are prompted to
enable Secure Boot.
6) Reboot; follow MOK steps to re-enable Secure Boot.
6b) Verify /proc/sys/kernel/secure_boot shows 1.
6c) Verify /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled shows 0.
= grub2 =
Booting signed kernels:
1) Try to boot a custom kernel
2) Verify that the kernel will not be loaded by grub (you should see an error
message about the signature)
Prompting on upgrade:
0) On a system that runs a dkms module (such as r8168-dkms, rtl8812au-dkms,
ndiswrapper-dkms, bbswitch-dkms, etc.)
1) Make sure that validation is enabled and reboot: 'sudo mokutil
--enable-validation && sudo reboot'
2) Upgrade to the new grub2 package (you may need to download the updated
package beforehand)
3) Validate that grub2 prompts you to disable shim validation.
= dkms =
Prompting for dkms on install:
1) Install r8168-dkms
2) Verify that you're asked to disable shim validation, and walked through
the process via debconf prompts.
Prompting for dkms on upgrade
0) On a system that runs a dkms module (such as r8168-dkms, rtl8812au-dkms,
ndiswrapper-dkms, bbswitch-dkms, etc.)
1) Make sure that validation is enabled and reboot: 'sudo mokutil
--enable-validation && reboot'
2) Upgrade to the new dkms package (you may need to download the updated
package beforehand)
3) Validate that dkms prompts you to disable shim validation.
= shim =
Booting:
-> Validate that it allows booting grubx64.efi signed with the old key.
-> Validate that it allows booting grubx64.efi signed with the new key.
Validation toggle:
0) Boot the system; verify if /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/MokSBStateRT-* is
present;
If MokSBStateRT is preset:
1) sudo mokutil --enable-validation && sudo reboot
2) Validate that Mok asks you if you want to enable validation
Otherwise:
1) sudo mokutil --disable-validation && sudo reboot
2) Validate that Mok asks you if you want to disable validation
Finally:
3) Complete the process to toggle validation state, reboot, and verify
whether MokSBStateRT is present.
4) Run mokutil again to toggle validation back to its former state.
[Regression Potential]
Issues to watch out for:
- (dkms) not prompting on upgrade of a dkms package/dkms itself if validation
is currently enabled (provided debconf does not have dkms/disable_secureboot
seen and set to false)
- (dkms, on new shim) prompting unnecessarily if validation is already
disabled
- (grub) not prompting on upgrade ...
- (grub) not prompting on upgrade across releases if validation is disabled;
without the applied SRU on original release.
- (grub, on new shim) prompting unecessarily ...
- (shim) failing to boot on some firmware that doesn't correctly follow
specification
- (shim) failing to load a properly-signed grub
- (shim) accepting to load a badly-signed grub
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