On Jan 13, 2019, at 1:49 AM, Greg Hudson <ghud...@mit.edu> wrote: > > On 1/11/19 11:08 AM, Yegui Cai wrote: >> Any plan to add the capability of expiring admin sessions into a future >> release? > > We can consider it, although it would come at a complexity cost in the > network code. Can you describe why that feature is important in your > deployment? > ________________________________________________ > Kerberos mailing list Kerberos@mit.edu > https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos
Banks and other highly regulated environments have requirements to implement controls around the access of individuals to systems and data. This includes “just in time” access provisioning and time-bound access to sensitive systems. For a detailed example, see ch. 11.1 of the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s “Technology Risk Management Guidelines” (TRM Guidelines <http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/Regulations%20and%20Financial%20Stability/Regulatory%20and%20Supervisory%20Framework/Risk%20Management/TRM%20Guidelines%20%2021%20June%202013.pdf>) "The [Financial Institution] should only grant user access to IT systems and networks on a need-to-use basis and within the period when the access is required.” Now, these kinds of things are often vague and you can probably satisfy the requirements in a number of ways. You *could* whack the admin session at the network level OR you *could* expire the admin principal that was used to authenticate the session (in an out of band process that’s been set up to manage such access) and demonstrate that even with a connected admin session the expired principal renders the session useless. One of the key points for such controls is being able to provide evidence that the control is being met since it is not sufficient to do the right thing, you have to also be able to *prove* that you’re doing the right thing. This is another can of worms entirely. jd ________________________________________________ Kerberos mailing list Kerberos@mit.edu https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos
