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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FEDIZ-232?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16686772#comment-16686772
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Pedro Alves commented on FEDIZ-232:
-----------------------------------
In our case the STS is signing the assertion and the IdP just wraps it in a
response. From what I understand from Fediz IdP, it creates a new token from
the one received from the STS, adds the required elements and signs it again.
We were under the assumption that only the STS was responsible for creating and
signing new tokens.
> 'wctx' parameter mandatory but protocol does not require
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: FEDIZ-232
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FEDIZ-232
> Project: CXF-Fediz
> Issue Type: Bug
> Reporter: Christian Fischer
> Priority: Major
>
> For logins which are not initiated by a valid session on the RP side the user
> cannot be authenticated because the wctx parameter is missing or has the
> wrong value.
> There are at least two scenarios in which this causes a unwanted behaviour of
> the system.
> * First is if the IDP/login page is bookmarked and returns only later after
> the session on the RP is timed out.
> * Second is something similar to a IDP initiated login flow. It's not in the
> WS federation protocol specification but according to our tests fediz could
> easily allow that if the 'wctx' check is removed.
> In the protocol specification the 'wctx' parameter is also only optional,
> where fediz expects it to be always present. There is a comment with respect
> to CSRF prevention but our security team didn't see the case for this since
> there is no passive way of authentication is used. In fact it's the actual
> authentication request that is supposed to be protected, but we don't see the
> need.
>
> One option (if the CSRF case is valid) would be to at least disable the
> 'wctx' state validation by setting a flag.
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