I prefer Type-2, as it seems a more straightforward approach overall, with fewer chances of “cross-interruptions”.
— Regards, Uri
Secure Resilient Systems and Technologies MIT Lincoln Laboratory On Nov 5, 2024, at 09:28, tirumal reddy <kond...@gmail.com> wrote:
I prefer Type-1 over Type-2, it seems more complicated to manage multiple certificates and the possibility of a downgrade attack . -Tiru On Tue, 5 Nov 2024 at 15: 40, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer=40cisco. com@ dmarc. ietf. org> wrote:
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I prefer Type-1 over Type-2, it seems more complicated to manage multiple certificates and the
possibility of a downgrade attack .
-Tiru
While I support the goals of this draft, I do not believe that the methods proposed are the most effective.
It tries to merge Type-1 (certificates that include both classical and PQ keys) and Type-2 (two separate certificates) methods of providing public keys, however I believe it would be cleaner to keep them separate.
For Type-1, if we use the ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs certificate format, then it is easy. That defines a new signature algorithm (which internally consists of a classical signature and a PQ signature pasted together, but we can ignore
the internal details). We can use that as the signature method within the Auth payload, and hence the only changes we need to make to IKE is to recognize this new signature method.
For Type-2 (multiple certificates), we need to request multiple certificates (which you do with the current proposal). However, it would be cleaner i(IMHO) if the other side just provided multiple CERT payloads and multiple AUTH payloads
(rather than try to combine them). Each AUTH payload would contain the signature (based on the public key from the corresponding CERT payload) of the same data which is being signed now. The idea is that if we keep the fundamental structure of IKE authentication
(just having multiple payloads when necessary), it may be easier for an existing IKE implementation to be extended.
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