Linda Dunbar <linda.dun...@futurewei.com> wrote: > The primary scenario for the proposed authentication method is from draft-ietf-rtgwg-multi-segment-sdwan > where an additional header (GENEVE Encapsulation [RFC8926]) is added to > the encrypted payload to steer packets through underlay networks. In > these scenarios, the underlay network edge nodes do not decrypt and > re-encrypt the payloads. The header information is used for optimizing > packet forwarding in underlay networks and, therefore, resides outside > the IPsec ESP header.
So, why is this an IPsec problem/concern? -- Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works -= IPv6 IoT consulting =- *I*LIKE*TRAINS*
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