On Wed, 17 Jun 2020, Toerless Eckert wrote:

Given how you are focussing on this aspect,
can i assume that you are happy with the everything
else in the suggested text ?

I don't know yet. I have to re-read the last draft version.

Wrt to tunnel vs. transport mode:

If you can, please propose specific text that would improve
the quality of the doc wrt. to your point.

I can only observe:

a) I have not found the word "profile" in neither rfc4301
nor rfc5996, so i have no basis from which to argue what could
or could not be called permissible for a "profile"

I don't think we have an official IETF definition of a profile, but it
usually means a collection of protocol parameters that are normally
negotiated. For an example IPsec profile, see:

https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6380.html

Another more recent one is the draft for the updated CNDSA profile:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-corcoran-cnsa-ipsec-profile-00

b) I have not seen MUST support transport and MUST support
tunnel mode, so being "incapable" of either option will
lead to closing the connection, and those implementatoins
are i think compliant with the IPsec/IKEv2 RFCs.

Tunnel Mode is Mandatory To Implement. Transpode Mode is not.

b) All router implementations i know that can do tunnel
and transport mode allow you to configure which option
specifically to use and they too will close a connection
is there is a mismatch. One could call that configuration
"unwilling".

Yes. In IKEv1, one was allowed to require Tunnel OR Transport
mode, but for IKEv2 it was a conscious decision to make
transport mode something a responder could refuse, without
breaking the IPsec connection. This was done specifically to
move most scenarios (especially over the internet, especially
when NAT is involved) to Tunnel Mode. Transport Mode can be
used but really should only be used if there is no NAT.

And those reasons are also why I now bring this up. I want to
avoid a new RFC that requires Transport Mode. It is fine to
recommend it, as long as the responder is still allowed to
refuse this, and be ensured that tunnel mode will be used instead.
A connection MUST NOT hard fail on not getting Transport Mode.

ACP draft does not even have a notion of "unwilling",
just "incapable".

My comments were triggered based on the texts in this email thread.
As I said, I still need to reread the latest draft version.

Paul

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