Hi Rich, I strongly disagree with your statement that “this is premature”, and the slides that you cite do not support that claim. I totally agree with the points in Kenny’s slides, especially as they pertain to QKD and SDO-shopping, but they say nothing about improvements to security protocols that use quantum-resistant *symmetric* cryptography. The Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2 specification is a sound and mature specification that uses existing crypto algorithms with parameters that are widely believed to be post quantum secure.
David > On Dec 11, 2019, at 11:40 AM, Salz, Rich <rs...@akamai.com> wrote: > > Slides: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/materials/slides-99-saag-post-quantum-cryptography > > Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abmd1n5WUvc&t=1451s > > > On 12/11/19, 11:36 AM, "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluh...@cisco.com> wrote: > > Did Kenny make this statement in the context of postquantum cryptography > (that is, public key algorithms that are believed to be secure even if the > adversary has a quantum computer)? > > That would certainly be a reasonable statement (as most postquantum > algorithms are fairly new, and are still being cryptographically vetted). > > On the other hand, this specific draft doesn't involve any postquantum > algorithms; it relies only on currently accepted algorithms, and so Kenny's > caution would not apply. > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Salz, Rich <rs...@akamai.com> >> Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2019 11:23 AM >> To: last-c...@ietf.org >> Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; ipsecme-cha...@ietf.org; david.walterm...@nist.gov; >> draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ik...@ietf.org >> Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09.txt> (Postquantum >> Preshared Keys for IKEv2) to Proposed Standard >> >> We are seeing a flurry of these kind of “post quantum protection” things. >> This is premature. The co-chair of the CFRG, Kenny Paterson, said so awhile >> back. >> >> At best, this should be EXPERIMENTAL. >> >> I would like to see an IESG policy that makes all drafts on this topic be >> EXPERIMENTAL. >> > > >
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