One week, and no replies... I will leave this issue open unless I get some suggested security considerations text.
The first paragraph in section 10.1 says the following. What else is missing? Tokens MUST be hard to guess. This is critical, because if an attacker can guess the token associated with an IKE SA, she can tear down the IKE SA and associated tunnels at will. When the token is delivered in the IKE_AUTH exchange, it is encrypted. When it is sent again in an unprotected notification, it is not, but that is the last time this token is ever used. Yoav On Oct 11, 2010, at 8:22 AM, Yoav Nir wrote: > Yaron: The security considerations are focused on details of the QCD > solution, rather then on the threats we are dealing with. These threats are > non-trivial to describe, since an active MITM attacker can easily cause an > IKE SA to be reset. OTOH, we don't want an active non-MITM attacker to be > able to do so. We need to analyze the threats in order to select a secure, > but not overly complex solution. > > > > Suggested text would be most welcome. > > Yoav > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > IPsec@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > > Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway. _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
