Hi Frederic,

I understand the scenario now and I agree that a solution is needed. But I have two issues, one general and one specific:

- Even though there are no interoperability implications, I think we should specify the token format. This will prevent people from making some security-critical design mistakes. In other words, we should have *one* token generation method.

- The proposed method uses the taker's IP address, making some assumptions on the load balancer's behavior. But what if the load balancer behaves a bit differently, e.g. by including the source port in the decision function? Such a system will still have the vulnerability. What if we choose instead to include the *maker* identity (a sequential member number, or a private IP, or even a MAC address)? This would prevent another member from re-generating the same token for an attacker, and as a side benefit, will not require token changes when the client is roaming.

Thanks,
        Yaron

On 15/10/10 11:53, Frederic Detienne wrote:
Hi Yaron,

In response to issue 193. For reference:

--8<--
Section 9.3: this entire discussion is probably redundant, because when a node 
fails in the LS cluster, you switch to another node. Implementing QCD on top of 
this is probably an overkill. If we remove this section, we can get rid of sec. 
5.2 as well, and we can focus on a single recommended way to generate the 
token, which would make analysis that much easier.
--8<--

9.3 has been moved to 10.4 under security consideration. I will refer to 10.4 
instead of 9.3 from now on.

The token generation method highlighted in 5.1 presents a security risk 
highlighted in section 10.4.

We can not get rid of 5.2 nor 10.4, however we could make it clearer that 5.2 
is the recommended token generation method when the risk highlighted in10.4 is 
present.

Regards,

        fred

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