Hi Dan,

I'm afraid I disagree with you on several counts. See below.

Thanks,
        Yaron

On 26.3.2010 20:11, Dan Harkins wrote:

   Telling administrators what they can and cannot do is really not
the function of our standards body. If someone wants to use a
"long secret" or a password to authenticate gateways, hosts, clients,
peers, or implementations (or whatever you want to call the box) it's
none of our business. We shouldn't say, "nope, sorry you can't do that,
this is a client and you should use a stand-alone AAA server because of
the obvious benefits that have eluded you."

We cannot tell administrators anything for the simple reason that they're not looking to us for guidance. However we do have some influence over vendors, and we should tell vendors what we think makes sense, i.e. what is the architecturally correct way to use the protocol.

More importantly, we should optimize the protocol (only) for the cases that we think are reasonable. So we should care very much about usage scenarios. As a concrete example, password management arguably matters much more to remote access than to gateway-to-gateway scenarios. Should we support it? Depends on the scenario(s) we want to work on.

   We have RFCs on "host requirements" and "router requirements". There
isn't an RFC on "peer requirements" or "client requirements". Those are
terms that started in marketecture powerpoint slides and should not be
used to constrain or neuter our protocols.
No. For years we've had specific IPsec work items on remote access, it's nothing new. If a protocol can be specified for the general use case, that's very well. But there will be protocols that are only applicable to some specific use cases, and that's fine, too.

   Dan.

On Fri, March 26, 2010 9:53 am, Kaz Kobara wrote:
Hi Yaron

Thank you for your clarification.

"between gateways" as opposed to
"between clients and gateways". So your assertion is correct.

(Between gateways, administrators can set long secrets, so the necessity
of
PAKE seems smaller than between clients and gateways where passwords are
recorded in the gateways and users have to type the passwords.)

Anyway, if the scope is limited only on "between gateways" but not
"between
clients and gateways," the title
"Password-Based Authentication in IKEv2: Selection Criteria and
Comparison"
seems misleading (since this itself misinforms that this criteria may be
applied to IKEv2 in any cases), and the above should be clearly mentioned
in
the document.

Kaz

-----Original Message-----
From: Yaron Sheffer [mailto:yaronf.i...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 2:14 PM
To: Kaz Kobara
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [IPsec] New PAKE Criteria draft posted (def. of gateway)

Hi Kaz,

I *thought* my intention was clear: "between gateways" as opposed to
"between clients and gateways". So your assertion is correct.

Thanks,
        Yaron

On 26.3.2010 1:40, Kaz Kobara wrote:
Hi Yaron

draft-sheffer-ipsecme-pake-criteria-02.txt says in Page 4
"This document is limited to the use of password-based authentication
to
achieve trust between gateways"

I would like to make sure that
"gateway" in this document does not encompass VPN clients and hosts,
right?

Kaz

-----Original Message-----
From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On
Behalf
Of
Yaron Sheffer
Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 3:31 AM
To: SeongHan Shin
Cc: IPsecme WG; Kazukuni Kobara
Subject: Re: [IPsec] New PAKE Criteria draft posted

Hi Shin,

Yes. For the typical remote access VPN, EAP is typically more useful.
Note that there is still need for strong password-based mutual
authentication EAP methods - but their home is the EMU working group.

In addition, the IPsecME has another charter item designed to fit
such
EAP methods (such as the future EAP-AugPAKE :-) into IKEv2.

Please see again the group's charter,
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/ipsecme/charters.

Thanks,
        Yaron

On 25.3.2010 20:07, SeongHan Shin wrote:
Dear Yaron Sheffer,

I have one question about the draft.

draft-sheffer-ipsecme-pake-criteria-02.txt says in Page 4
"This document is limited to the use of password-based
authentication
to
achieve trust between gateways"

Is this a consensus of this WG?

Best regards,
Shin

On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 3:46 PM, Yaron Sheffer<yaronf.i...@gmail.com
<mailto:yaronf.i...@gmail.com>>   wrote:

      Hi,

      after the good discussion in Anaheim, and with the help of
comments
      received on and off the list, I have updated the PAKE Criteria
draft
      and posted it as

http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-sheffer-ipsecme-pake-criteria-02.txt.

      I have added a number of criteria, clarified others, and added
      numbering (SEC1-SEC6, IPR1-IPR3 etc.).

      Thanks,
          Yaron
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