[[ This message has gotten no replies. I am far from a PF_KEY expert, and need 
to hear from the WG before proceeding. --Paul Hoffman ]]

At 4:34 PM -0500 3/2/10, Dan McDonald wrote:
>Even as of draft-08, section 2.9:
>
>   When an RFC4301-compliant IPsec subsystem receives an IP packet that
>   matches a "protect" selector in its Security Policy Database (SPD),
>   the subsystem protects that packet with IPsec.  When no SA exists
>   yet, it is the task of IKE to create it.  Maintenance of a system's
>   SPD is outside the scope of IKE (see [PFKEY] for an example
>   programming interface, although it only applies to IKEv1), though
>   some implementations might update their SPD in connection with the
>   running of IKE (for an example scenario, see Section 1.1.3).
>
>is entirely incorrect about PF_KEY.
>
>PF_KEY maintains the SADB and expresses the SPD and/or triggering packet when
>IPsec requires a new outbound SA.  Some PF_KEY extensions (notably in any
>KAME/WIDE-derived implementations) also maintain the SPD.  And it certainly
>is not applicable to just IKEv1 - it was intended to allow an ARBITRARY Key
>Management daemon to add/delete/etc. SAs.  The PF_KEY SADB_ACQUIRE message is
>an expression of the SPD entry for the packet.
>
>So as not to just be a whiner, I will provide a replacement first two
>paragraphs:
>
>   When an RFC4301-compliant IPsec subsystem receives an IP packet that
>   matches a "protect" selector in its Security Policy Database (SPD), the
>   subsystem protects that packet with IPsec.  When no SA exists yet, it is
>   the task of IKE to create it.  Maintenance of a system's SPD is outside
>   the scope of IKE, though some implementations might update their SPD in
>   connection with the running of IKE (for an example scenario, see Section
>   1.1.3).
>
>   Traffic Selector (TS) payloads allow endpoints to communicate some of the
>   information from their SPD to their peers.  These must be communicated to
>   IKE from the SPD (for example the PF_KEY API [PFKEY] uses the SADB_ACQUIRE
>   message).  TS payloads specify the selection criteria for packets that
>   will be forwarded over the newly set up SA.  This can serve as a
>   consistency check in some scenarios to assure that the SPDs are
>   consistent.  In others, it guides the dynamic update of the SPD.
>
>Thanks,
>Dan
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