Yaron, If we allocate new numbers to do it right then we will, in fact, live forever with an ambiguous interpretation of groups 19, 20, and 21. I agree we should fix the problem and not live with ambiguity. The proposal to allocate new numbers doesn't seem to do that though.
Dan. On Mon, December 21, 2009 7:48 am, Yaron Sheffer wrote: > Hi Tero, > > I support your position (and disagree with Yoav). We had better fix this > problem now by allocating a few more numbers, than live forever with an > ambiguous interpretation to the numbers that everybody's using. > > Thanks, > Yaron > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of > Tero Kivinen > Sent: Monday, December 21, 2009 13:21 > To: Yoav Nir > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [IPsec] IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Elliptic curve mess (RFC4753, > RFC5114, RFC4869, and draft-solinas-rfc4753bis-01) > > Yoav Nir writes: >> If there is such an implementation, then it's not interoperating >> with all the other implementations and should be fixed. > > It is following the published RFC, so why should it be fixed. I think > everybody agreed that making major non-interoperable change in the > errata was not proper way of fixing the thing (there were lots of > developers who had missed that). > > This whole discussion about the errata started because one implementor > was implementing the RFC and wanted to make sure that the y is really > added, and he wanted to make sure that he understood it correctly as > that would eman that those groups cannot be made complient to FIPS > 140-2. > > He had not noticed the errata. There were also other people who had > not noticed the errata (including me). > > I am sure there is also people who do not follow the IPsec list and > still do implement things (following IPsec list is not really > requirement for implementing IPsec). > > I am only person in our office who regularly follow IPsec list and all > others just take RFCs and read them and write code based on them. I am > not sure if any of those people actually even know how to find > errata... > > Made quick poll around the office, and found out that noboby here had > checked any of the errata for any of the RFCs they have worked on. > They said they usually do check for rfc-index to see if the RFC was > updated or obsoleted, but that is it. > >> If someone shipped something like that, then the only reason they >> haven't noticed yet, is because they (1) didn't test it well enough, > > Doing testing against your implementation does not detect that kind of > problem as everything works fine. Also for quite a lot of IPsec > vendors the main goal is to make implementation which works with their > own products and the secondary goal is that it works with other > vendor's product too. > >> and (2) their customers are using some other option like 1024-bit >> MODP group (and 3DES, but that's beside the point) > > That is most likely true for all current IPsec implementations. > Elliptic curves are not really used that much yet. That is the reason > I want to fix this problem now, not move it to future. > >> Anyway, making everyone add a new group "28" just so nobody needs to >> patch their old implementation of group "20" seems like wasted >> effort to me. We can keep group 20, and fix the spec to prescribe >> what everybody is doing anyway. > > I do not want to see the support request saying that our product does > not interoperate vendor X's product when using group 19 and then later > find out that is because the other vendor has implemented RFC4753 > and didn't notice the errata. > > Also it will most likely take our customer and our support quite a > long time before they even realize why recipient of IKE_AUTH will > simply drop the packet because of wrong MAC. After that wasted effort > I know that it will come to me, and I need to explain to our customer > that our code is correct and the other implementation was also correct > when they wrote the code, but they are not correct anymore... > > I do not think the elliptic curves are used that much in the current > IPsec installations, so I think we still have time to fix this problem > properly. > -- > [email protected] > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > > Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway. > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
