On Fri, Dec 04, 2009 at 01:39:46PM -0500, Dan McDonald wrote:
> The bigger point being missed by this thread, I think, is that it
> seems that any work in multi-level security needs to deal with
> successful interoperability. If it doesn't, there's little point in
> documenting a single-platform solution as part of a working group's
> output.
+1.
The proposed work item is, at first glance anyways, too SELinux-
specific.
Note that SMACK encodes its labels as CIPSO labels, so a scheme that
uses CIPSO can possibly be used in SMACK and non-SMACK environments, and
possibly even be mixed.
In any case, there have been lengthy threads elsewhere (saag, IIRC)
about MAC interoperability.
Some options to consider:
- implicit labeling
- derived from CERTs
- derived from IDs
- derived from network addresses
- negotiated labeling
- requires a DOI negotiation of some sort
- each node asserts one, or more, or a range of labels (SMACK, for
example, doesn't support the notion of label ranges) and the peers
evaluate and narrow the assertion according to policy and produce
All I see in the proposed work item is single label assertions. That
strikes me as insufficient.
Nico
--
_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
IPsec@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
